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POLITICAL IDENTITIES, VOTE CHOICE, AND PARTICIPATION: EXPLORING THE 
IMPACT OF EXPRESSIVE IDENTITIES AND COMPETING ISSUE POSITIONS 
 
America’s contemporary political structure has emphasized a single liberal-conservative 
ideological dimension. Yet, a substantial number of citizens do not neatly reflect this elite divide 
in their issue positions across both economic and social issues. These “dual ideologues” may feel 
unrepresented and alienated by a political system that does not offer many choices in candidates 
or parties that are consistent with their issue positions. However, it remains unclear whether dual 
ideologues identify with either of the two major parties or ideological groups in the United States 
based on non-ideological factors. An analysis of data from the 1980 to 2008 American National 
Election Study shows that although dual ideologues identify with political groups at similar rates 
to consistent ideologues, one group of dual ideologues – libertarians -- hold weaker connections 
to these political groups. The study further examines the importance of expressive versus 
instrumental identities in influencing whet r dual ideologues vote consistently with their chosen 
party and participate in electoral activities at the same rates as more consistent ideologues. These 
findings add further support to the importance of political identities, but they also indicate that 
the effects of strong, consistent issue positions cannot be dismissed, as a strong identity alone 
cannot overcome the lack of representation for those with competing issue positions. Strong and 
consistent issue positions play an important role in influencing many forms of political behavior, 
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American politics today can at best be described as contentious and at its worst 
acrimonious. More than at any other time in recent history, politics and governing have become a 
fierce battle between two distinct and opposing sides with little room for compromise or 
conciliation. But it was not always this way. At one time, Democrats and Republicans were not 
as split ideologically and issue positions often overlapped between these groups in a way th t 
made compromise feasible. What has caused such vitriol today? Research has pointed to growing 
polarization as conflicts extended to cultural issues that have raised the rancor between groups in 
a way that previous conflict over economic issues did not (Hunter 1992; Shafer and Claggett 
1995). This ‘culture war’ has pitted social conservatives against social liberals, whi e at the same 
time the political parties have become virtually synonymous with ideology, with Republicans 
holding conservative positions and Democrats holding liberal positions.  
Indeed, it has become widely accepted that the parties and political elites in the U ited 
States have become more polarized over the past several decades. Although disagreement 
remains over the level of polarization among the mass public, at the very least elit  polarization 
has clarified individuals’ views of the parties, increased awareness of the ideological differences 
between the parties, and led to a resurgence in the role and importance of parties (Heth rington 
2001). The growing polarization between parties has also enc uraged greater engagement with 
politics as a growing number of citizens indicate they care who wins an election, recognize 
differences between the parties and candidates, vote, and participate in other electoral activities 
(Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Hetherington 2008). 
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While the level of ideological polarization among the mass public remains contenti us, 
some have argued that affective polarization between members of the two parties and deological 
groups has increased substantially over the past several decades (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 
2012; Malka and Lelkes 2010).  In particular, as predicted by social identity theory, levels of 
partisan bias and anger have increased between Republicans and Democrats (Iyengar, Sood, and 
Lelkes 2012) and strong partisan identities have led to greater participation. Al hough partisan 
identity has received the bulk of attention, strong ideological identity also plays a role in 
participation independently from issue positions (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015).  
Most discussions about the political identities of the mass public revolve around whether 
they are Republican versus Democrat or conservative versus liberal with little consideration of 
their actual issue positions or whether citizens so neatly reflect the elite pos ions represented by 
the parties. In fact, a substantial number of citizens do not clearly r flect the elite divide of 
conservative or liberal issue positions across both economic and social issues. If these issue 
positions are salient to the individuals (dual ideologues) who have conservative positions on one 
set of issues (economic or social) and liberal positions on the other set, they are left with no party 
to adequately represent them in government.  
While strong party and ideological identities have been shown to positively influence 
levels of voting and other forms of electoral participation, it remains unclear how political 
identities affect political behavior for those citizens who do not mirror the single liberal-
conservative ideological dimension of elites. Based on issue positions alone, we may expect 
citizens who hold competing positions that do not match party or candidate choices to be less 
likely to identify with a party or ideological group, to vote for opposing parties more frequently, 
and to participate less frequently than those with consistent ideologies. But, if dual ideologues 
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identify with a party or ideology based on social affiliations or other factors that promote an 
emotional attachment to a party independently of specific issue positions, than we would not 
expect competing issue positions to impact political identity or behavior.  
This paper will explore how those with conflicting issue positions interact with a political 
system that does not adequately represent their views. In addition to considering whether dual 
ideologues hold similar levels of partisan and ideological identities as their more consistent 
counterparts, I also consider how political identities impact behavior such as candidate choice 
and electoral participation and whether any variance in these behaviors can be explained by 
differences in identity or a lack of consistent issue positions. While both expressive and 
instrumental perspectives on partisanship and ideology claim empirical support, much of the 
literature has argued that the social identity aspects of partisanship, and to a lesser extent 
ideology, play a more substantial role in influencing political behavior and particul ly electoral 
participation. By considering the role of identity among individuals who hold strong issue 
positions, but contrasting those who hold consistent and those who hold competing issue 
positions, this paper will add further support to the importance of political identities; but it also 
argues that the effects of strong, consistent issue positions cannot be dismissed, as a strong 
identity alone cannot overcome the lack of representation for those with competing issue 
positions. Strong and consistent issue positions play an important role in influencing many forms 
of political behavior, independently of political identity.  
 
Polarization and the Role of Issue Positions 
It has become widely accepted that the parties and political elites in the United States 
have become increasingly polarized over the past several decades. Republican and Democrats in 
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Congress have increasingly diverged ideologically and vote as two distinct blocs (Poole and 
Rosenthal 1991, 2001). However, the level of polarization among the mass public remains more 
controversial.  On one hand, evidence points to multiple areas of increasing fractures mong the 
electorate. The differences are especially apparent among cultural issues, such as abortion and 
gay marriage, which comprise the “culture war” between social conservatives and liberals 
(Hunter 1992). As the parties polarized on these issues and increasingly brought them into the 
electoral arena, one group of scholars has argued that the public has also polarized across the 
issues. As the parties have become more distinctive, party identification among citizens has 
become more ideological, a trend that is particularly notable among the politically engaged 
(Abramowitz 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998). According to the ‘conflict extension’ 
theory, the polarization we see today has arisen as the parties became divided across several 
major issue areas at once. In this view, cultural issues have become an important part of party 
conflict, but have not displaced previous issues such as social welfare or racial cleav ges. These 
multiple areas of conflict increase polarization and extreme partisanship among the general 
public (Layman and Carsey 2002). The increased importance of partisanship became evident in 
the 1990s and 2000s as both partisan defection and split-ticke  voting in elections became less 
common (Hetherington 2001; Niemi and Stanley 2010).  
Another view, however, argues that the public is not polarized, but instead remains 
generally centrist and that a growing share are politically independent. Fiorina, Abrams, and 
Pope (2005) argue that the culture war has been largely overstated and that the electorate remains 
moderate. Rather, as elite cues on partisanship and ideology have become clearer and more 
consistent, the public has simply sorted themselves into ideological camps that match with heir 
partisan leanings (Levendusky 2009). Thus, although common in earlier decades, a conservative 
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Democrat has become rare. So, although ideology and issue positions now tend to align with 
partisanship, this has not increased the overall degree of polarization in the electorat  especially 
as most remain moderates and many have become independent (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 
2005). 
Although disagreement remains over the level of polarization among the mass public, at 
the very least elite polarization has clarified individuals’ views of the parties, increased 
awareness of the ideological differences between the parties, and led to a resurgenc  in the role 
and importance of parties (Hetherington 2001). One consequence of these clearer views of the 
parties and their ideological differences should be to prompt individuals to more closely align 
their chosen party with their issue positions. Carsey and Layman (2006) argue that citizens who 
are aware of party differences on an issue and who find that issue salient should change their 
party to match their issue positions. Those who are aware of the party’s position on the issue, but 
do not find the issue salient, should change their issue position to match the chosen party’s 
position. While those who are not aware of party differences will have no reason to change either 
their chosen party or issue position (Carsey and Layman 2006).  
Whether citizens are polarized or not, this theory suggests that most individuals should 
have a clearer view of the parties, and that either by changing party or changing issue positions, 
most citizens will move towards having their issue positions match those of the party they belong 
to. However, not all citizens have been so neatly sorted and not all have brought their issue 
positions into alignment with their chosen party or ideological group. Indeed, although political 
elites and many citizens can be described along a single ideological spectrum, a subset of the 
citizenry maintains competing issue positions between economic and social issues– holding 
conservative issue positions on one dimension but liberal positions on the other.  
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In addition to traditional liberal and conservative groups, two other groups also represent 
a significant proportion of the public – those who mix conservative economic beliefs with liberal 
social beliefs and those who mix liberal economic beliefs with more conservativ  social 
positions. The former have been called libertarians, the latter populists (Boaz and Kirby 2006; 
Maddox and Lilie 1984) or communitarians (Janda et al. 2012). These dual ideologues do not 
mirror the elite single dimensional liberal-conservative framework, but are still a significant 
portion of the electorate as they have made up anywhere from 10-30% of the electorate over the 
past few decades. For those that find issues across both domains to be salient, it would be nearly 
impossible for these citizens to change their party or issue positions to match across both 
economic and social domains. 
 
Partisanship and Ideology as Social Identities 
So, how do these dual ideologues interact with a political system in which the dominant 
ideological alignment of economic and social issue positions do not match with theirs? At first 
glance these inconsistent issue positions might not seem surprising given the predominant view 
among political scientists that citizens are largely incapable of ideological thought and that issue 
positions play only a secondary role to factors such as party identity when it comes to aking 
political decisions (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1962). Indeed prominent theories of party 
identification and ideology would suggest that issue positions are irrelevant, indicat g that we 
should not expect dual ideologues to behave any differently than consistent ideologues.  
The role and meaning of ideology in the United States has remained a contentious subject 
since Converse (1962) first argued that the great majority of citizens do not appr ach politics in 
ideological terms. Indeed many individuals do not even clearly understand the meaning of 
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common terms such as liberal or conservative. In addition, this line of research suggests that 
citizens display minimal constraint across issue positions with most issue positions not bound 
together by any broader cognitive structure. Even individual issue positions are held only lightly 
and are incredibly susceptible to elite and media manipulation (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 
1997; Zaller 1996; Zaller and Feldman 1992).  More recently, Ellis and Stimson (2012) suggest 
that citizens choose their issue preferences somewhat randomly, do not understand the meaning 
of these positions for actual policy outcomes, and choose their ideological identity based on 
symbolic factors. The clearest example of this are those who identify as conservative because of 
the clear religious connotations versus any real conservative issue positions.  
While ideology is seen as having little role in citizen preferences and behavior, party 
identification is still seen as being the single strongest influence on how the public assesses 
candidates, views political news, and determines political attitudes. Early work viewed 
partisanship as a long-standing psychological attachment to a party, which orig nates from 
childhood socialization (Campbell et al. 1960; Jennings and Niemi 1974; Lewis-Beck 2009). For 
those who identify with a party, partisan cues frequently take the place of well-thought out issue 
positions and attention to political news and campaigns (Brader 2006). These partisans are seen 
as automatically and uncritically accepting messages coming from their own party while 
rejecting any messages from the opposing party (Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009; Zaller 
1996).  
This theory of partisanship draws heavily on social psychology and social identity theory, 
which proposes that an individual feels a sense of belonging to a group that promotes a desire to
strengthen the position of that group. Under this expressive view of partisanship, individuals 
identify with a party just as they do any other group such as a religion or social class. Social 
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identity theory also requires both a positive sentiment toward one’s own group as well
negative sentiment towards opposing groups (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel and Turner 1979). While the 
level of ideological polarization among the mass public remains contentious, to explain the level 
of acrimony seen in politics today, some have argued that affective polarization between 
members of the two parties and ideological groups has increased substantially over the past 
several decades (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012; Malka and Lelkes 2010).  In particular, as 
predicted by social identity theory, levels of partisan bias and anger have increased between 
Republicans and Democrats (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes 2012) and strong partisan identities have 
led to greater participation. Mason (2015: 58) argues that partisans have become “prejudiced 
against each other, active just for the sake of winning, and increasingly angry. We might believe 
that we are responding to specific policy disputes, but to a very real extent we are also being 
driven by an automatic, basic need to defend our social group.” Although partisan identity has 
received the bulk of attention, strong ideological identity also pays a role in participation 
independently from issue positions (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). 
However, the importance of issue positions should not be so easily dismissed. Since 
Converse’s seminal article, several factors, including the increase in elite polarization have led to 
an increase in ideological awareness and thinking among the public (Abramowitz and Saunders 
1998; Layman and Carsey 2000). Citizens are unlikely to view partisan conflict in ideological 
terms in a party system that does not highlight well-known and easily identified ideological 
brands (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976); but, as we’ve seen, the parties have become more 
distinctive and their relative issue positions more identifiable, which increases the ability of 
citizens to base their partisanship on ideological considerations. Indeed, the framing of politics in 
the United States today often invokes a struggle between liberalism and conservativism over 
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symbols, policy, and culture (Ellis and Stimson 2012). As Abramowitz (2010: 159) argues “The 
Democratic and Republican parties today offer voters a clear- ut choice between coherent policy 
packages, one liberal and one conservative, and most voters appear to have little difficu ty 
choosing the party whose package is more to their liking.”  This is especially true among the 
most politically active.  
 
Dimensions of Ideology 
However, even as citizens have become more ideological, the appropriateness of 
common measures of ideology has been questioned. Ideology is typically discussed as though it 
is arrayed along a single liberal-conservative dimension. This description adequately portrays 
political elites. The distinction between liberals and conservatives has only become more 
prominent in the current era of polarization as elites and the two major parties have become more 
clearly differentiated and consistently ideological in their policy positions across a range of both 
economic and social issues (Poole and Rosenthal 2000, 2001). Certainly, some portion of the 
electorate mirrors this consistency on the liberal-conservative scale, and for these citizens strong 
ideology can lead to higher electoral participation. The distinction between parties hould give 
partisans further reinforcement for their existing policy preferences and encourage greater 
engagement with politics to ensure that their policy preferences win out. Indeed, a growing 
number of citizens indicate they care who wins an election, recognize differences between the 
parties and candidates, and participate in electoral activities (Hetherington 2008).  
It’s not clear, though, that a single dimension of ideology can adequately describe all 
members of the mass public as not all citizens display the same level of constraint across issues. 
Rather, recent research has shown that ideology is better conceived of as two dimensional for at 
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least some portion of the electorate that have inconsistent views on issues across economic and 
social domains (Klar 2014; Shafer and Claggett 1995; Swedlow and Wyckoff 2009). The 
traditional conception of the liberal-conservative framework was based on economi  and social 
welfare issues, such as the government’s role in managing the economy and programs such as 
social security that resulted from the New Deal. But as social and cultural issues such as 
abortion, drug use, and women’s rights became more prominent in the 1970s, these issues did not 
fit as easily into the traditional liberal-conservative spectrum, which led to a growing number of 
citizens with conflicting liberal/conservative positions across social and economic issues (Shafer 
and Claggett 1995).  
 
Political Behavior of Dual Ideologues 
The question of how dual ideologues interact with a political system in which the 
dominant ideological alignment of economic and social issue positions does not match with 
theirs has become even more relevant as polarization has created more distinct parties with 
clearer issue positions. Existing theory predicts disengagement as citizens’ attitudes conflict with 
available candidate and/or party choices. For those with conflicting ideologies between economic 
and social dimensions, the increased polarization of the parties has left them cross-pressured and 
with few choices among parties or candidates who match their beliefs. Thu , we might expect 
these individuals to be less likely to identify with a party or ideology group, be mor likely to 
vote for candidates of differing parties, and to participate less. Despite strong ideologies, any 
party or candidate this group might support would ikely only match their ideological views on 
one of the two dimensions, which makes choosing a party to belong to or a single candidate to 
support more difficult (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011). Further, while consistent 
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ideologues are likely to vote regularly for their party, individuals who disagree on a major policy 
issue are more persuadable voters and may be more likely to respond to campaign information 
and change their vote choices (Hillygus and Shields 2008). Given this, we might expect these 
individuals to also participate in electoral activities less frequently since their candidate choice is 
less solid. In addition to being cross-pressured by competing issue positions, dual ideologues 
may also feel unrepresented and alienated because ofthe lack of candidates that adequately 
reflect their views. Alienation and indifference to existing political choices have been shown to 
significantly decrease the likelihood of voting (Plane and Gershtenson 2004; Zipp 1985). 
However, while cross-pressures and alienation have the potential to reduce engagemet 
with politics, there remains some segment of the population who do not recognize that their issue 
positions conflict with the party structure despite the increased clarity of the party positions. To 
be meaningfully cross-pressured by issues, citizens must both care about those issues and 
recognize party and candidate differences on them (Hillygus and Shields 2008). Although 
political elites have polarized over the past few decades, not all voters are entirely aware of this 
dramatic shift and many still report that there are few differences between the parties. This is 
particularly true for those in lower income groups and those with lower levels of ducation. 
Those in the highest income categories often see a larger difference between candidates and 
parties than do those in lower income groups (Leighley and Nagler 2013). The impact of cross-
pressures on depressing turnout and participation is likely to be limited by citizen’s accurate 
knowledge of the differences between the parties and candidates.  
In fact, previous literature presents a much more complicated story than simple 
disengagement when considering participation among two-dimensional ideologues. Two 
previous studies have found that one group of dual ideologues largely votes at the same level as 
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consistent ideologues, while the other group participates at levels significantly below all other 
groups (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011; Hussey 2011). Both studies find that libertarians 
vote at similar rates to consistent ideologues – and actually vote at higher rates than consistent 
liberals. This group does participate in slightly fewer campaign activities, although the difference 
with consistent liberals is small. Communitarians on the other hand are significantly less engaged 
as they vote and participate at substantially lower rat s than all other groups – even moderates 
(Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011; Hussey 2011). Despite the strong potential for du
ideologues to feel cross-pressured, most are not. In the 2000s, just 7% of communitarians felt 
cross-pressures, while 29% of libertarians did. The lack of cross-pressures among 
communitarians is likely due to a low understanding of party positions. On questions about 
abortion, for example, only 30% of the group was able to correctly place Democrats t the left of 
Republicans (Hussey 2011). 
The reasons for the substantially different participation rates among dual ideologues are 
not entirely clear. Hussey (2011) finds that while dual ideologues do participate less, cross-
pressures had no significant effect on voting or participation for these groups.  While the two 
groups differ substantially in a number of demographic characteristics, the differences in 
participation rates remain even after controlling for these variables. One possibility is that major 
party candidates have been more likely to run on libertarian ideals than populist ones leaving 
communitarians particularly unrepresented (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2011). One again, 
however, this explanation is only valid for those who recognize and understand differences 
between candidates, which is not true of all members of the electorate and particularly 
problematic among the communitarian group.  
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One area that has not been given sufficient attention is whether and how dual ideologues 
identify with a party or ideological group. Partisan and ideological identities have been shown to 
act as social identities (Bartels 2002; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Iyengar, Sood, and 
Lelkes 2012), that have the power to affect behavior. Given that partisan and ideological 
identities play an important role in explaining campaign activity (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 
2015), the extent to which dual ideologues identify with a party or ideological group, despite 
their competing issue positions, may influence their levels of participation. Someresearch 
predicts that many who have conflicting positions on social and economic issues will self-
identify as a moderate on a unidimensional scale of ideology as a sort of averaging effect (Klar 
2014). Even so, most citizens place more emphasis on the economic dimension which continues 
to have a greater influence on both ideological and partisan self-placement as well as on vote 
choice (Carmines, Ensley, and Wagner 2012; Klar 2014). Thus, we might expect dual ideologues 
to self-identify as more moderate than consistent ideologues, but also to be swayed towards one 
side by their economic positions. 
These theories take an instrumental view of ideology and consider party choice to be 
based primarily on issue positions and the desire to advance certain policy goals.  As predicted 
by social identity theory, however, the expressive approach to partisanship suggest  that these 
social affiliations promote an emotional attachment to a party independently of speci ic issue 
positions (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).  Expressive partisanship therefore rsults in a 
desire to help the party one belongs to rather than the desire to advance specific i sues or policy 
goals. The role of expressive partisanship has likely only increased in the current era of 
polarization with Republicans and Democrats showing increasing hostility toward one another. 
This hostility is not consistently founded in policy attitudes but is strongly based on group
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identity (Iyengar and Westwood 2014). Furthermore, the desire to protect and advance the party 
one belongs to has a significant effect on campaign activism (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). 
Although party identity has received the majority of attention, ideological identity also 
plays an important role. In addition to the conception of ideology as an integrated value system, 
as measured by consistent issue positions, we should also consider ideological identity as 
measured by self-categorization (Malka and Lelkes 2010). Ideological identity functions as a 
psychological attachment to a particular group, much like partisan identity and functions 
separately from issue positions (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). While partisan identity has the 
largest and most consistent effect on activism, ideological identity also has a significant effec , 
and at least one study finds ideological identity to be more important than issue intensity, which 
played a more inconsistent and smaller role in campaign activism (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 
2015).  
If party and ideological identities play a stronger role in predicting voting and cmpaign 
activism, we may not expect the competing issue positions of dual ideologues to be a signific nt 
hindrance to electoral participation if these ideologues identify with political groups for reasons 
other than issue preferences. Given that dual ideologues do participate at lower rates, these 
findings lead to the questions of whether dual ideologues are less likely to identify with a party 
or ideological group than consistent ideologues and whether significant differences in 
identification exist between the two dual ideologue types. Further, does identification with a 
partisan or ideological group affect candidate choice or participation for dual ideologues in the 
same way that it does for consistent ideologues?  
If issue positions matter to electoral behavior, we should see dual ideologues behaving 
differently than their more consistent counterparts. Nonetheless, issue positions hould not be 
15 
 
expected to completely mitigate the effects of expressive interests, indicating an mportant role 
of identities even for dual ideologues. Dahl (1971) argues that participatory democracy requires 
citizens to take two distinct actions: first to decide whether or not to participate and second to 
decide on elected representatives. Following this, in addition to partisan identity, I examine the 
differences between consistent and dual ideologues on measures of candidate choice and 
electoral participation. The competing roles of expressive and instrumental identities and their 
influence on behavior lead to the following hypotheses regarding political identity, vote choices, 
and electoral participation. First in regards to political identities: 
1) Although many dual ideologues will identify with a party and ideological group, they 
should be less likely to identify than similar consistent ideologues.  
2) The likelihood of dual ideologues identifying with a party and ideological group has 
declined over time as the parties’ positions have been clarified. 
 
In regards to vote consistency: 
 
1) Among both ideologue groups, those with stronger partisan and ideological identities 
should be less likely to defect or split their ticket.  
2) Dual ideologues should be more likely to defect from their chosen party and split their 
ticket than consistent ideologues, across identity strengths.  
3) Over time, dual ideologues should become more likely to defect and split their ticket in 
comparison to consistent ideologues.  
 
Finally, in regards to electoral participation:  
1) Among both ideologue groups, those with stronger partisan and ideological identities will 
be more likely to vote and to engage in other forms of electoral participation.  
2) Dual ideologues should be less likely to vote and less likely to participate in other 
electoral activities than consistent ideologues, across identity strengths.  
3) Over time, dual ideologues should become less likely to vote and participate in other 





DATA AND METHODS 
This study’s data come from the cumulative file of the American National Election 
Studies (ANES) from 1984 through 2008. The ANES asks respondents about their positions on 
multiple policy questions as well as a series of questions about political identity, vote choices, 
and which political activities the respondent engaged in. I begin analysis in 1984 to insure 
consistency across the issue questions being used. Prior to 1984, differences in the policy 
questions asked of respondents make comparison across time more difficult.  
Political identity variables are constructed based on the self-reported strength of 
partisanship and ideology. These variables were created without respect to which side the 
respondent prefers (i.e. Democrat versus Republican or conservative versus liberal), but ther 
the strength of identity. The partisan identity variable is a 4 point scale ranging from 0 for those 
who describe themselves as independent with no partisan affiliation to a 3 for those with a strong 
partisan identity. A 1 on this scale represents those who initially indicate that they are 
independent, but in follow-up questions indicate that they “lean” toward a particular party. A 2 
indicates someone with a self-described weak identity. While partisan strength is a weaker 
measure of social identity than a multi-item scale would be, it serves as an appropriate proxy 
although results may be weaker than if a full identity scale was used (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 
2015). 
Analysis also includes self-reported ideological strength as a proxy for ide logical 
identity.  This measure utilizes the ANES question asking respondents to place thems lves on a 7 
point scale ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative.  Similarly to partisan 
identity this variable is also folded to reflect the strength of an individual’s ideology regardless 
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of whether they identified as conservative or liberal. Given that many respondents indicated that 
they didn’t know to questions about ideology, this variable includes these respondents as the 
base category in order to capture this subset of citizens who either do not understand the 
ideological system or who simply choose not to place themselves on the ideology scale (su h 
that 0= Don’t know; 1= Independent; 2= Weak ideology; 3 = Strong ideology). Although we 
cannot know the exact reasons for individuals not placing themselves on the ideological scale, 
this group represents a substantial part of the sample at 27% and should not be simply left out of 
the analysis.  
Two measures of vote consistency are used. First, those who defect from their party or 
ideology by voting for an opposing presidential candidate (i.e. a self-described Republican votes 
for a democratic or independent candidate). Although presidential candidates do not run as 
liberals or conservatives, in the current political limate it is generally expected that Republicans 
are conservative and Democrats are liberal, thus allowing me to consider whether individuals 
defect from their ideological identity. The second measure of vote consistency is those who split 
their ticket by voting for one party for president and an opposing party for House and/or Senate 
races. This includes all respondents whether or not they identify with a party or ideological 
group.  
Two dependent variables are also analyzed to measure two different facets of elctoral 
participation: first, whether the respondent voted in a given election and second, political activity 
beyond voting. The second dependent variable represents the level of an individual’s political
activity by counting five specific activities measured by the ANES: 1) trying to influence 
someone else’s vote, 2) displaying a campaign sign or button, 3) attending a political meeting or 
rally, 4) working on a political campaign, and 5) making a monetary contribution to a party or 
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candidate. These variables were used to create a participation count that ranged from 0 to 3 
indicating how politically active respondents were in each election year. The top category of 3 
includes all of those who participated in 3 or more activities because the percentage of those 
participating in 4 or 5 activities was very small (1.5% and .8% respectively). For the sample as a 
whole, 75% of respondents said they voted while 25% reported not voting. Sixty-one percent of 
the sample reported participating in zero campaign activities, while 26% reported one activity, 
8% two activities and 5% three or more electoral activities.  
An independent variable of ideologue types was created using self-reported issue 
positions on several policy related questions within both the economic and social dimensions. 
First, an index of political issue items was created for both the economic and social dimensions. 
The ANES includes multiple policy questions measuring liberal or conservative policy views on 
a range of issue types. Questions used to create the social scale included when abortion should be 
allowed, whether laws should be enacted to protect homosexuals from discrimination, and 
whether women should have an equal role.  Questions used to create the economic scale included 
whether government should provide health insurance, whether the government should guarantee 
jobs, the appropriate level of government-funded services, and aid to blacks. Each of these 
questions was coded on a 1-7 scale such that lower scores indicate more liberal responses and 
higher scores indicate more conservative responses. Scores were averaged to create a mean score 
across all questions in each dimension. 
Ideologue types were identified based on these scores. Those with consistently 
conservative responses in both the economic and social domains were labeled as conservatives 
and consistently liberal responses coded as liberals. Those who displayed liberal responses to 
economic issues but conservative responses to social issues are labeled communitarians and 
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those who displayed conservative responses to economic issues but liberal responses to scial 
issues are labeled as libertarian. Included as the base category for comparison are moderates who 
report moderate issue positions on both the economic and social issues scales. 
In addition to these constructed variables, control variables include education, age, 
gender, race, region (south versus non-south), as well as measures of political knowledge and 
political efficacy. 
A logistic regression model is used to analyze how ideologue type, party identification, 
and ideological identification impact the dichotomous variables of party defection, ticket-
splitting, and voting. An ordered logistic regression is used to estimate the two identity models. 
A negative binomial regression model is used to estimate the electoral activity model since the 
participation activities function as a count variable. Since there is significant evidence of over 
dispersion in the data (G2 = 135.9, p<.001) the negative binomial regression model is preferred to 






WHO ARE DUAL IDEOLOGUES? 
Although liberals and conservatives receive the most attention, the two dual ideologue 
groups also make up a substantial portion of the electorate; however the relative proportion has 
changed significantly over the years. Those with consistently liberal issue positions has increased 
from roughly 12% in 1984 to nearly 25% of the electorate in 2008. Though the numbers of 
consistent liberals and conservatives were roughly equal in 1984, the numbers of conservatives 
declined to just under 10% by 2008. However, the number of libertarians (economically 
conservative, but socially liberal) increased during the same time period to almost 15% of the 
electorate in 2008. Communitarians had the most consistent downward trend over this time 
period. Although they represented 13% of the electorate in 1984 (second only to conservatives in 
that year), their numbers declined to just under 5% of the electorate in 2008. Other citizens, not 
included in this graph or subsequent analysis, hold liberal or conservative issue positions n one 
dimension and moderate views on another and accounted for about 40% of the electorate.   
Figure 1: Percent Within Each Ideologue Type 
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Table 1 displays a number of significant demographic variables among each of the four 
types of ideologues as well as moderates for comparison. Those in the communitarian group 
show pronounced differences particularly in education and income where they lag substantially 
behind all other groups. Communitarians have a mean education level of 2.14 on a 1-4 sc le 
where a 1 indicates grade school or less, 2 equals high school, 3 indicates some college, and 4 is 
a college or advanced degree. Just 6% of communitarians have a college degree in contrast to the 
36% of libertarians who have a degree. Libertarians have the highest mean education level at 
2.93, but this is on par with that of liberals.  
 Communitarians similarly lag substantially behind the other groups in income level. The 
majority of this group (58%) fall in the lowest levels of income below the 34th percentile. Just 
16% fall above the 68th percentile in income. Libertarians, however, have the largest income 
overall with a mean of 3.28 with 47% falling in the highest income percentiles. Among other 
demographic characteristics of these groups, the clearest difference comes from race with 
minorities representing 48% of the communitarian group, but only 17% of the libertarian group.  
 Given their competing issue positions, some may expect dual ideologues to have weaker 
positions on issues than their more consistent counterparts. Despite some variation in issue 
strength, this largely does not hold up. The strength of issue positions displayed in Table 2 are 
based on mean scores across the aforementioned economic and social issues. Each issue is rated  
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics by Issue-based Ideology Type 
 
 
Moderate Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
% of Electorate 10 15 11 9 6 
Average Age 47 42 48 47 47 
% Female 53 63 45 51 56 
% Minority 26 34 15 17 48 
Average Education level  2.66 2.92 2.69 2.93 2.14 
Average Income level  2.87 2.81 3.06 3.28 2.22 
SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study. 
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on a scale of 1-7 with lower numbers indicating more liberal positions and higher numbers ones 
that are more conservative and scores closer to the middle of the range indicating positions that 
are more moderate. Based on this data, libertarians are slightly more moderate than conservatives 
on economic issues (5.38 versus 5.58) and slightly more moderate than liberals on social issues 
(1.49 versus 1.39). However neither of these are significant differences. Communitarians are 
slightly more moderate on social ssues than conservatives (5.69 versus 5.77), but actually more 
liberal than liberals on social issues. This indicates that dual ideologues are rm rkably similar to 
their more consistent counterparts on the strength of their issue positions. 
  
Table 2: Strength of Issue Positions 
 
 
Moderate Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
Economic Issues 4.02 2.47 5.58 5.38 2.39 
Social Issues 3.45 1.39 5.77 1.49 5.69 




POLITICAL IDENTITY  
Expressive and instrumental views of identity give different explanations for why citizens 
join political parties. A sizeable literature identifies partisan identity as a result of socialization 
with children typically following along with their parents’ party (Jennings and Niemi 1974; 
Searing, Schwartz, and Lind 1973). While a more instrumental view of identity suggests that 
individuals’ choice of political party and ideological group is an outcome of the relative 
closeness of that party to the individuals’ issue positions (Downs 1957). The importance of issue 
positions has become significantly more prominent as a result of ideological realignment, 
especially as elites emphasize ideology more frequently (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; 
Saunders and Abramowitz 2004). The conflicting views about expressive versus instrume tal 
antecedents of political identity suggest that while many dual ideologues will identify with 
political groups based on factors such as socialization or group interest, at least some members of 
this group are unlikely to identify because the two main parties and ideological groups do not 
adequately represent their issue positions. Further, the role of issue positions should have 
increased over time as the parties’ positions became clearer and dual ideologues became more 
aware that their own issue positions do not match up. This leads to the following two hypotheses:  
1) Although many dual ideologues will identify with a party and ideological group, they 
should be less likely to identify than similar consistent ideologues.  
2) The likelihood of dual ideologues identifying with a party and ideological group has 
declined over time as the parties’ positions have been clarified. 
 
Despite conflicting issue positions, the vast majority of dual ideologues do identify with a 
party. Among libertarians, 90% identify with a party, a number not significantly different from 
the 92% of conservatives and 91% of liberals who do. Communitarians do identify at a slight 
lower though still substantial rate of 84%. A more substantial difference between groups lies in 
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whether they identify as strong or weak partisans. While 38% of liberals and 40% of 
conservatives identify as strong partisans, only 30% of libertarians do. Despite lower numbers 
identifying as a partisan overall, more communitarians identify as a strong partisan (36%) then 
libertarians do. As expected, most conflicted ideologues’ partisanship matches wit  their 
economic positions although a sizeable number are clearly influenced by cultural issues. Sixty 
percent of libertarians identify as Republicans and 63% of communitarians identify as 
Democrats.  
An even greater difference exists among groups in whether they identify with a 
conservative or liberal ideology. Seventy-one percent of consistent conservatives self-id ntify 
with an ideological group (69% as conservatives, 2% as liberals), representing the hi hest 
number among all groups. However, libertarians are more likely to identify ideologically than 
the other two ideological types including consistent liberals. Overall, 64% of libertarians self-
identify, while only 58% of liberals do. Communitarians lag far behind this, however, with only  
32% identifying as either conservative or liberal.  Although existing theory predicts that dual 
ideologues will be more likely to identify as moderate – a way of averaging out their conflicting 
Table 3: Political Identity by Issue-based Ideology Type 
 
 
Moderate Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
% Republican 35 11 69 60 21 
% Democrat 53 80 23 30 63 
% Strong Partisan 24 38 40 30 36 
% Weak or Leaning  48 54 51 60 49 
% Independent 13 8 8 10 15 
% Identify as Conservative 23 5 69 58 11 
% Identify as Liberal 13 53 2 6 21 
% Strong ideology 12 39 52 32 17 
% Weak ideology 27 21 21 35 16 
% Self-Identify as Moderate 39 16 9 17 18 
% Saying “don’t know” 19 22 17 15 48 
SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study. 
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issue positions – this trend is not strongly evident in ideological identification among these 
groups.  Only a slightly higher percentage of libertarians and communitarians identify as 
moderate versus consistent liberals. Consistent conservatives are the least likely to identify as 
moderate at 10%.  Of note in Table 3 is the high percentage of communitarians who responded 
that they don’t know when asked to place themselves on the ideological scale. At 48%, this 
group responded ‘don’t know’ at a much higher rate than any other group – liberals, the next 
highest group responded don’t know just 22% of the time. Given communitarians’ low levels of 
education, political knowledge, and lack of understanding of the parties’ relative ideological 
positions, it seems likely that this answer reflects a lack of understanding of the ideological 
system rather than a belief that they fall outside of the system. Also notable is that dual 
ideologues are less likely to identify as a strong ideologue than consistent ideologues are. This is 
especially true among communitarians who identify as a strong ideologue just 17% of the time, 
while 39% of liberals and 52% of conservatives identify as a strong ideologue. Whil still 
identifying with an ideology, libertarians are much more likely to identify as a weak ideologue 
than other groups and do so 35% of the time compared to 21% for liberals and conservatives. 
One potential explanation for why dual ideologues are willing to identify with a party or 
ideological group despite their mismatched issue positions is that they simply don’t understand 
the parties positions or that their own positions do not match their chosen party. Given 
communitarians lower levels of education overall, we might expect them to have a lowr 
understanding of the parties’ positions and whether their own issue positions match up. To test 
this possibility, we can compare the ability of indiviuals to correctly place the parties in the 
appropriate order on the liberal conservative dimension. Those who incorrectly place the 
Republican candidate to the left of the Democratic candidate are likely to have a limited
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understanding of the issue positions of the parties and to be unaware that their own issue 
positions do not match up. As Table 4 shows, at nearly 31%, a far greater percentage of 
communitarians were unable to correctly place the parties than the other groups. Libertarians are 
only modestly worse at placing the candidates than liberals or conservatives. Interestingly, a 
much higher percentage of communitarians also indicated that they saw no difference between 
the candidates. While the liberal conservative scale may be particularly difficult for some 
individuals, these results hold true when comparing candidates and parties on common issues 
such as abortion as well.  
These numbers indicate that communitarians do have a significantly more difficult time 
in correctly placing the candidate and therefore may be unaware that their own issue positions do 
not match up with either of the parties. The data suggest, however, that understanding cross-
pressures is only modestly related to whether one identifies with a party or ideol gical group and 
how strongly. Among communitarians for example, of those who incorrectly placed the 
candidates only 8% identify as independent and nearly 42% identify as a strong partisan. But 
these numbers are only marginally different for those who correctly understood the differ nce 
between candidates. Among this group, 12% identify as an independent and 37% held a strong 
partisan identity (percentage in the leaning and weak categories were almost identical). This 
trend was similar for libertarians, indicating that for both dual ideologue groups, understanding 
that they are cross-pressured does not necessarily affect whether they hold a strong affinity for 
political groups.  
Table 4: Placement of Parties’ Relative Ideological Positions  
 
 
Moderate Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
% With incorrect placement 22.6 12.87 11.23 14.93 30.86 
% Who see no difference 9.39 6.93 4.18 6.86 15.59 
SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study. 
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Another important aspect of identity, according to group identity theory, is that it prompts 
positive evaluations of the in-group, while creating lower evaluations of outgroups (Tajfel and 
Turner 1979). In the current polarized era, this has become a particularly important trend as 
partisans have increasingly rated their own party more positively and the opposing party more 
negatively (Iyengar and Westwood 2014). However, this is one area where dual ideologues differ 
from their more consistent counterparts. Feelings towards both parties and ideolog cal groups is 
measured on the ANES by asking respondents to rate each group on 0-100 thermometer scale 
with 100 indicating a warm feeling toward the group and 0 indicating a cool feeling. Naturally, it 
is expected that individuals will rate the group that they belong to more warmly than an outside 
group. Tables 5 and 6 display the average thermometer ratings for each group based on the party 
with which they identify. By breaking out the data this way, we can more accurately compare 
group differences because dual ideologues are slightly less consistent in party choice (for 
example, nearly 80% of liberals identify as Democrats and only 11% as Republicans, but only 
60% of communitarians identify as Democrats and 21% identify as Republicans).   
Based on this data, we can see that dual ideologues typically rate their chosen party 
somewhat similarly to their more consistent counterparts. For example, self-identi ied Democrats 
who hold consistent liberal issue positions rate the Democratic Party at 74.68 on the thermometer 
scale, while Libertarians rate them at 72.01 and Communitarians rate them even higher at 79.70. 
This similarity holds across groups in each of the party ratings.  This is not surprising given that 
this is their chosen party. However, where dual ideologues differ is in their ratings of the 
opposing party. Keeping with the same example, liberals who identify as Democrats rate the 
Republican Party at a low 32.22, while the dual ideologue groups rate them over 10 points higher 
at 45.64 and 46.48. While these are still generally negative ratings, they are not as low as those  
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of liberals, and create smaller differences between their ratings of the two groups. Although not 
the subject of this paper, it is also notable that those with conservative issue positions who self-
identify as Democrats, rate the Democratic Party higher at 72.40, but also rate the Republican 
Party higher than any other group does at 49.86.  
These trends are even more pronounced for ideological groups with significantly smaller 
differences in ratings of the two groups among both dual ideologue groups. As previous 
literature suggests, ideology groups are not as affectively charged as the parties (Huddy, Mason, 
and Aarøe 2015). But among consistent ideologues, we still see generally higher and positive 
ratings of the ideology that matches with their chosen party as well as lower and negative ratings 
of the out-group. This is especially notable among self-identified Republicans with conservative 
issue positions who rate the conservative ideological group at 74.34 and the liberal ideological 
group at 33.27 for a difference of over 41 points. Dual ideologue groups, especially those who 
identify as conservative, display much more positive ratings of the ideological ut-group and 
typically show only a very small difference in their ratings of conservative nd liberal ideological 
groups. These higher ratings of the out-group among dual ideologues may indicate at least some 
recognition that their issue positions do not line up, which moderates the impact of identity and 
affective polarization as well.  
Table 5: Group Thermometer Ratings for Self-identified Democrats 
 
 
Moderate Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
Republican Rating 45.33 32.22 49.86 45.64 46.48 
Democrat Rating 72.30 74.68 72.40 72.01 79.70 
Difference 26.97 42.46 22.54 26.36 33.22 
      
Conservative Rating 56.04 46.5 61.51 59.72 55.70 
Liberal Rating 57.51 68.22 51.23 60.45 56.73 
Difference 1.47 21.72 10.28 .73 1.03 
SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study. 
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 Thus far, the relationship between issue consistency and political identities has been 
mixed. While dual ideologues tend to identify with a party and ideological group at similar rates 
as their more consistent counterparts, despite understanding that the parties do not fully represent 
their issue positions, libertarians do tend to identify at weaker levels than eier communitarians 
or consistent ideologues. Furthermore, the differing affective evaluations of the parties, based on 
the thermometer scores, suggest that identity plays a lesser role for dual ideologues than for more 
consistent ideologues.  
To further test whether being a dual ideologue impacts political identity, I next turn to an 
ordered logistic regression model. In addition to the standard control variables mentioned 
previously, in this section I also include a dummy variable that measures whether one 
understands the placement of the parties in order to control for the fact that those who do not 
understand that their issue positions are different from their party of choice cannot be reasonably 
expected to behave any differently than consistent ideologues whose issue positions do match up.  
Results of the logit model for both party identity and ideological identity are displayed in 
Table 7.  Each of the consistent ideologue type variables are statistically significant in predicting 
whether one expresses a higher level of partisan identity.  For consistent liberals and 
conservatives, the odds of reporting a higher level of partisan identity than moderates are 57%  
Table 6: Group Thermometer Ratings for Self-identified Republicans 
 
 
Moderate Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
Republican Rating 70.27 64.01 73.67 69.30 73.91 
Democrat Rating 49.03 51.65 34.77 41.64 48.58 
Difference 21.24 12.36 38.9 27.66 25.33 
      
Conservative Rating 63.49 57.29 74.34 66.56 60.28 
Liberal Rating 50.20 46.15 33.27 45.91 50.28 
Difference 13.29 10.14 41.07 20.65 10.00 




(z=5.051 p<.001) and 68% respectively (z=5.685 p<.001), holding all other variables at their 
means. The results for dual ideologues are mixed. Communitarians show little differ nce from 
consistent ideologues in expressing partisan identity with the odds of reporting a higher identity 
Table 7: Ordered Logistic Regression Results for Party ID and Ideological ID 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Party ID Ideological ID 
   
Liberal 0.454*** 0.726*** 
 (0.0898) (0.0891) 
Conservative 0.518*** 1.449*** 
 (0.0911) (0.0938) 
Libertarian 0.0882 0.514*** 
 (0.0973) (0.0959) 
Communitarian 0.457*** -0.0512 
 (0.116) (0.116) 
Education 0.106*** 0.399*** 
 (0.0395) (0.0398) 
Income -0.0236 0.0253 
 (0.0316) (0.0318) 
Age 0.0175*** -4.94e-05 
 (0.00203) (0.00203) 
Female 0.233*** -0.142** 
 (0.0628) (0.0631) 
Race 0.0316 -0.149*** 
 (0.0487) (0.0492) 
South 0.0982 -0.0960 
 (0.0680) (0.0690) 
Knowledge 0.0279** -0.00519 
 (0.0112) (0.0114) 
Efficacy 0.0762 0.172*** 
 (0.0514) (0.0519) 
Correct Placement 0.0123 0.624*** 
 (0.0858) (0.0881) 
Constant cut1 -0.742*** 0.462** 
 (0.211) (0.208) 
Constant cut2 1.063*** 1.718*** 
 (0.208) (0.209) 
Constant cut3 2.377*** 3.013*** 
 (0.211) (0.213) 
   
Psuedo R2 .24 .28 
Observations 3,624 3,632 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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being 58% (z=3.948 p<.001) higher than moderates. Libertarians on the other hand show only 
small and insignificant odds of expressing a stronger political identity.  
Similarly for ideological identity, each of the consistent ideologue groups show a positive 
and significant effect. The odds of reporting a higher level of ideological identity increase by 
107% (z=8.147 p<.001) for consistent liberals and by 98% (z=7.902 p<.001) for consistent 
conservatives. Again, the results for dual ideologues are mixed, but in the opposite direction. 
Unlike party identity, the odds of libertarians reporting a strong ideological identity increase by 
67% (z=5.357 p<.001) over moderates. However, communitarians show only a small negative 
and insignificant effect. Interestingly, being able to correctly place the parties on the ideological 
continuum has no effect on party identification but increases the odds of a higher ideological 
identity by 87% (z=7.091 p<.001). 
 Figure 2 displays the probability of each ideological group identifying with each strength 
of party identity. The probability of any group identifying as an independent is small and does 
not differ in a statistically significant way across groups. Similarly, the probability of identifying 
as a weak partisan is virtually the same across all groups (at abou 31.5%). The probability of a 
Figure 2: Predicted Probability of Party Identification 
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libertarian identifying as a leaning partisan at 29.4% is only marginally different from that of 
consistent ideologues (23.9 and 22.9% for liberals and conservatives).  The major difference 
between groups lies in the probability of libertarians identifying as a strong partisan, as this 
group has a much lower probability (at 29.7%) than any other group. Communitarians’ 
probability of identifying as a strong partisan (37.9%) nearly matches that of consistent liberals  
 (37.8%) and is only slightly lower than that of consistent conservatives (39.4%).  
 On the other hand, the probability of identifying at each level of ideological identity 
varies considerably among these four groups (Figure 3). Conservatives are the least likely to be 
unable to place themselves on this scale, with only a 6.7% probability of saying they don’t know. 
Libertarians and liberals display a slightly higher propensity to respond ‘d’t know’ at 15.5% 
and 12.9% probabilities respectively. Communitarians on the other hand respond don’t know 
much more frequently, with a predicted probability of 24.4%. Liberals and libertarians display 
similar probabilities of identifying as moderate (21.3% and 23.7% respectively), with 
communitarians only slightly higher (28.7%).  Consistent conservatives are least lik ly to 
Figure 3: Probability of Ideological Identification 
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identify as a moderate with a predicted probability of only 13.5%. The probabilities of 
identifying as a weak ideologue are similar across groups, although with more variation than we 
see among weak party identification. Again conservatives are the least likely o identify as a 
weak ideologue (27.8% predicted probability), while consistent liberals are actually the highest 
at 31.3%, with libertarians and communitarians falling between these extremes. Once again, the 
greatest variation comes among those with a strong identity. Consistent conservatives are 
extremely likely to have a strong identity with a 52% predicted probability with liberals and 
libertarians falling somewhat below this at 34.4% and 29.8% respectively, while communitarians 
have a probability of a strong ideological identity of only 19.4%. 
 Next we turn to whether or not the likelihood of identifying with a party or ideological 
group has changed over time as polarization has increased and as the parties have become more 
distinct. In order to ensure an adequate number of cases within each time point, I pool data 
across decades to compare results from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s (full logit results for each 
decade can be found in Tables 14 and 15 in the appendix).  As expected, among consistent 
ideologues, the odds of expressing a stronger identity increases in each subsequent decade. The 
odds of an increased identity for each group over time are displayed in Table 8.  For instance, in 
the 1980s, consistent liberals have odds of 35% (z=1.964 p<.001) of expressing a higher partisan 
identity, which increases to 64% (z=3.797, p<.001) in the 1990s, and increases again to 102.3% 
(z=3.159, p<.001) higher odds in the 2000s. Once again, we see mixed results for the two dual 
ideologue groups, however. Consistent with the overall data discussed previously, libertarians 
show no statistically significant increased odds of expressing a stronger identity and the effects 
that do exist are small and actually negative in the 2000s. Communitarians, on the other hand, 
show increased odds of identifying at stronger levels of partisanship in each subsequent d cade 
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and actually show a higher propensity to have a strong party identity in the 2000s than either 
consistent ideologue group. In the 1980s, communitarians have marginally significant odds of
37% (z=1.940 p<.1) of expressing a higher partisan identity, which increases to 65% (z=2.559, 
p<.05) in the 1990s, and increases again to 141% (z=2.126, p<.05) higher odds in the 2000s. 
 As with the overall data for ideological identification, the over-time results vary 
substantially within and between groups. Liberals show increased odds of a strong identity from 
the 1980s to the 2000s, although this drops somewhat in the interim 1990s. Conservatives 
though, show a sustained increase in each subsequent decade with a particularly large increase in 
the 2000s. Libertarians show a similar pattern to liberals with an overall increase f om the 1980s 
Table 8: Odds of a Stronger Identity Strength 
Party Identity Strength 
 Overall 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Liberal 57.4*** 35.0** 64.2*** 102.3*** 
 (5.051) (1.964) (3.799) (3.159) 
Conservative 67.9*** 47.2*** 85.5*** 70.0** 
 (5.685) (2.724) (4.547) (1.994) 
Libertarian 9.2 18.1 3.0 -9.0 
 (.906) (1.118) (.193) (-.373) 
Communitarian 57.9*** 37.1* 65.2** 141.4** 
 (3.948) (1.940) (2.559) (2.126) 
Ideology Identity Strength 
 Overall 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Liberal 106.7*** 116.4*** 72.6*** 224.5*** 
 (8.147) (5.060) (4.202) (5.402) 
Conservative 326.0*** 263.1*** 306.7*** 996.8*** 
 (15.443) (8.901) (10.070) (7.777) 
Libertarian 67.1*** 92.9*** 19.9* 145.3*** 
 (5.135) (4.542) (1.186) (3.528) 
Communitarian -5.0 -7.2 -4.7 -16.4 
 (-.442) (-.461) (-.245) (-.453) 
Note: Odds displayed as percentage. Z scores in parentheses.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study. 
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to the 2000s, with a decrease in the 1990s. Despite the growing strength of libertarian’s odds of a 
stronger ideological identification, the increase is significantly less substantial than that of 
liberals or conservatives suggesting that their expressive identities wer  moderated somewhat by 
the divergent issue positions. Communitarians are once again the outlier, as they display no 
statistically significant change in their odds of a stronger ideological identity.  
 The differences between the ideologue groups become even more prominent when we 
consider the predicted probabilities of having a strong partisan identity and how this changes 
over time for each group as displayed in Figure 4 (Table 16 in the appendix shows predicted 
probabilities for each group over time). In the 1980s, few differences between the groups existed, 
with only a small divergence between groups at strong levels of party strength. Between the 
1980s and 2000s, both consistent liberals and conservatives increased significantly in their 
Figure 4: Probability of Party Identification Over Time 
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probability of being strong partisans. Liberals increased from a 35.9% to a 46.5% probability, 
while conservatives increased from 37.9% to 42.2%. During this same time period, libertarians 
decreased in the probability of being a strong partisan from 32.8% to 28.1%.  But, consistent 
with previous trends of communitarians, this group increased more than even the consistnt 
ideologues from 28.1% to 50.9%.  
 Changes in the predicted probability of a strong ideological identity are also notable over 
time as seen in Figure 5. Both liberals and conservatives display an increased likelihood of 
holding a strong ideological identity with liberals increasing from 35.4% in the 1980s to 41.5% 
in the 2000s (with a small dip in the 1990s), and conservatives increasing from 47.9% in the 
1980s to 67% in the 2000s. Libertarians experienced only a small change during this time period 
increasing from a predicted probability of 32.8% in the 1980s to 34.9% in the 2000s. 
Figure 5: Probability of Ideological Identification Over Time 
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Communitarians on the other hand, marginally decreased from a 19% probability of holding a 
strong ideological identity, to only a 15.5% probability. Despite increased elite messaging about 
the relative issue positions of the parties and the increased alignment of ideology and 
partisanship over this time, communitarians increased in their likelihood of saying ‘don’t know’ 
during this time frame from a 25% to 30.6% predicted probability. Libertarians remain d 
relatively consistent on this response while liberals and conservatives decreased in their 
likelihood of responding ‘don’t know’.  
 
Conclusions 
 Overall, I find mixed support for the hypotheses about the political identification of dual 
ideologues. The first hypothesis stated that dual ideologues should be less likely to identify with 
partisan and ideological groups than consistent ideologues. On partisan identity, this s certainly 
true for libertarians, who showed no difference in their propensity to dentify with a party than 
do moderates while both consistent ideologue groups showed substantially increased and 
statistically significant odds of identifying with a party. Similarly, libertarians have a much lower 
probability of identifying as a strong partisan than either consistent group. Communitarians, 
though, contradict this hypothesis as they are just as likely to identify with a party and to identify 
as a strong partisan as the consistent ideologues.  
 I also find mixed results in regards to ideological identity. Communitarians are 
substantially less likely to identify with an ideological group or to identify with a strong ideology 
than either group of consistent ideologues.  Libertarians on the other hand are more likely to
identify with an ideological group than moderates, but this effect is weaker than that for either 
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consistent liberals or conservatives. Libertarians are also more likely to identify as moderates 
than are consistent ideologues.  
 Mixed results hold for the over-time models as well.  My second hypothesis stated that 
the likelihood of dual ideologues identifying with a party or ideological group has declined over 
time as the parties’ relative positions have been clarified. On the partisan identity measure, this is 
patently not true for communitarians, who actually increased their likelihood of identifying with 
a party and identified as a strong partisan even more than the consistent ideologue groups. 
However, being a libertarian showed no statistically significant effect on party identification, 
although the overall trend did show a decrease in party identification from the 1980s through he 
2000s.  
 Once again, similar but mixed results hold for ideological identity. The effects for 
communitarians were not statistically significant at any point in time, although the trend showed 
a small decrease in the odds of communitarians displaying stronger identity. Con radicting 
expectations, libertarians did show an increase in their probability of identifying with an 
ideological group. Although both consistent ideologues and libertarians have responded to 
polarization by increasing their ideological strength, consistent ideologues hav  increased 
identity at a much higher rate overall than did libertarians indicating that this group’s dueling 






Candidate choice and whether or not it aligns with one’s party has become particularly 
salient as polarization has become more prominent in recent decades. While the majority of 
citizens who identify with a party typically vote for that party’s candidates, defection was not 
always uncommon. Beginning in the 1990s, however, defection has become increasingly 
unlikely. As the parties have become more homogenous and clearer about their competing issue 
positions, it is easier for citizens to pick a party that matches their issue positions, w th fewer 
issues pulling them to the other side (although see Hillygus and Shields discussion about the r le 
of wedge issues). Further, affective polarization suggests that individuals view their party as 
“their team” and increasingly view the out-party in more negative terms (Iyengar and Westwood 
2014; Malka and Lelkes 2010). Voting for the opposing party would be antithetical to this group 
mentality, regardless of issue positions.  
In this section, I consider two types of voting behavior and whether that behavior differs for 
consistent and dual ideologues. First, I look at whether an individual defects from her party in the 
presidential contest by voting for the opposing party or an independent candidate. It should be 
noted that this is more likely in certain election years with a strong third party candidate such as 
Ross Perot in 1992 or Ralph Nader in 2000. Prior to the 1990s, high proportions of partisans 
regularly voted for the opposing party. Between 1952 and 1988, at least 18% of partisans voted 
for the opposing party, but this number declined substantially in all 2000 elections through 2008 
when only 9% of partisans voted for a candidate of the opposite party.  
Second, I consider split-ticket voting when an individual votes for one party in the 
presidential race and an opposing party in House and/or Senate elections. Straight-ticket voting 
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has also increased substantially as the role of party identity has increased and as the electorate 
has become more polarized (Hetherington 2001; Niemi and Stanley 2010).  Because of their 
competing issue positions, dual ideologues may be more likely to be swayed by the opposing 
candidate’s appeals, although the expressive nature of partisanship may influence many to stick 
with their ‘team’. The decrease in presidential vote defection and split-ticket voting leads to the 
following hypotheses about whether dual ideologues display the same levels of vote consistency 
as consistent ideologues and whether these have changed over time.  
1) Among both ideologue groups, those with stronger partisan and ideological identities 
should be less likely to defect or split their ticket.  
2) Dual ideologues should be more likely to defect from their chosen party and split their 
ticket than consistent ideologues, across identity strengths.  
3) Over time, dual ideologues should become more likely to defect and split their ticket in 
comparison to consistent ideologues.  
 
Table 9 displays the percentage within each of the dual and consistent ideologue groups 
who defected in a presidential race or split their ticket. Dual ideologues are several percentage 
points more likely to both defect and split their ticket during the period from 1984 to 2008. Vote 
defection is only slightly more likely among Libertarians and Communitarians (at 17% and 16% 
respectively), while liberals and conservatives defect between 10% and 14% of the time. 
However ticket-splitting occurs at much higher rates and with more variation. Ticket-split ing is 
especially prominent among libertarians who split 30% of the time, compared to just over 20% 
among conservatives and 17% for liberals. Communitarians also split more than consistent 
ideologues with nearly 25% splitting their ticket.  
Table 9: Vote Defection and Split Ticket Rates 
 
 
Moderate Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
Vote Defection 19.34 10.93 13.90 16.77 15.83 
Split Ticket 30.81 17.38 20.60 29.58 24.48 
SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study. 
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Figures 6 and 7 show these trends over time. Both dual ideologues and consistent 
ideologues show similar trends of defecting over time with large upticks among all groups in 
1992 (with third party candidate Ross Perot receiving a number of these votes). Libertarians 
showed the highest propensity for defecting of the ideologue groups and are on par with 
moderates from 1988-2000, when communitarians overtook them. Again, we see much more 
variable trends for ticket-splitting, but with both dual ideologue groups showing substantially 
higher propensities for ticket-splitting than consistent ideologues, especially after 2000. As 
expected, ticket-splitting decreased significantly after 1996 for consistent ideologues. However, 
for dual ideologues, after declining somewhat in the 1990s, ticket-splitting actually became much 
more common in the 2000s, defying the general trends seen as a result of polarization. Although 
ticket-splitting did dip somewhat in 2008 for dual ideologues, these groups still voted for 
opposing parties at much higher rates than consistent ideologues (for exampl, 24% of the time 
for libertarians compared to only 11% for liberals). This suggests that dual ideologues have not 
responded to polarization in the same manner as consistent ideologues and r main less attached 
to their party of choice.  
Figure 6: Percent Defecting From Party Figure 7: Percent Splitting Ticket 
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 To consider the effects of identity on vote choice and what these tell us about the effects 
of instrumental versus expressive identities, I next turn to logit models for both presidential vote 
defection and ticket-splitting. The logit results for both models are displayed in Table 10. Among 
the various types of ideologues, none of the groups have a statistically significant connection to 
defecting in the presidential vote except for liberals who are 34% less likely to defect than 
Table 10: Logit Results for Vote Defection and Split Ticket Voting 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Vote Defection Split Ticket 
   
Liberal -0.469*** -0.364*** 
 (0.156) (0.140) 
Conservative -0.172 -0.333** 
 (0.152) (0.140) 
Libertarian -0.0324 0.0607 
 (0.158) (0.143) 
Communitarian -0.212 -0.136 
 (0.203) (0.186) 
Education -0.167** -0.0824 
 (0.0668) (0.0595) 
Income 0.00262 0.177*** 
 (0.0540) (0.0505) 
Age -0.00992*** -0.00730** 
 (0.00344) (0.00319) 
Female 0.166 0.260*** 
 (0.107) (0.0968) 
Race -0.309*** -0.171** 
 (0.0981) (0.0840) 
South 0.0720 0.230** 
 (0.117) (0.105) 
Knowledge 0.00346 0.0199 
 (0.0190) (0.0174) 
Efficacy -0.152* -0.0851 
 (0.0897) (0.0800) 
Party Strength -0.575*** -0.433*** 
 (0.0663) (0.0503) 
Ideology Strength -0.169*** -0.207*** 
 (0.0516) (0.0467) 
Constant 2.022*** 0.824** 
 (0.403) (0.355) 
   
Pseudo R2 .22 .18 
Observations 2,871 2,620 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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moderates. The other groups are all less likely to defect, but none approach levels of 
significance.  
However, both partisan and ideological identity have a significant effect on whether one 
will defect. Ideology is statistically significant with a coefficient of .169, although this is 
substantially below that of the strength of partisan attachment with a coefficient of .575. A one 
category change in the strength of partisan identity decreases the odds of defecting by 59% 
(p<.001), while a one category change in the strength of ideology decreases the odds of defecting 
by 20% (p<.001), holding all other variables constant at their means.  
The importance of partisan and ideological identities on the probability of defecting in 
the presidential vote as well as their differing impacts on consistent and dual ideologues can be 
seen in Figures 8 and 9. As expected, those with strong identities are less likely to defect across 
all ideological groups. Further, as is clear from Figure 8, the differences between groups lessens 
as party strength increases. While liberals are the least likely to defect at every party strength, 
libertarians are the most likely to defect, although the gap between groups narrows to only .03 at 
the strongest level of party identity.  Those with strong liberal issue positions, but who describe 
themselves as independent (group 1) have .32 predicted probability of defecting (95% CI: .25,
Figure 8: Predicted Probability of Defecting, 
by Party Strength 
Figure 9: Predicted Probability of Defecting, 
by Ideology Strength 
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.39), while those who have a strong party identity (4) have only a .08 probability of defecting 
(95% CI: .06, .1). While liberals have the lowest chance of defecting overall, libertar ans have 
the highest across all party strengths with a .42 (95% CI: .34, .50) probability of defecting for 
those who describe themselves as independent and a .11 (95% CI: .09, .14) probability for those 
who see themselves as strong partisans. While the overall trend is similar for al gr ups with 
stronger partisans statistically less likely to defect, it should be noted that the differences within 
each party strength category are not statistically significant. So while a weak lib ral is predicted 
to defect less than a weak communitarian or liberal these differences are not statistically 
significant for the overall period of 1984-2008. As we will see later in this section however, the 
differences become significant when we look at the trends over time. 
As expected, the effects of ideological strength are lower than those of party strength but 
generally move in the same direction, with liberals having the lowest rate of defection and 
libertarians the highest. As discussed previously, because of the high number of individuals who 
are unable or refuse to place themselves on the ideology continuum, the ideology strength
variable has a base category (0) consisting of those who say they ‘don’t know’ in response to the 
question which asks them if they are liberal or conservative. For those with liberal issue 
positions, but who are unable to identify with an ideology group, .15 (95% CI: .12, .19) are 
predicted to defect, while only .09 (95% CI: .08, .11) with a strong ideological identity can be 
expected to defect. Unlike party identity, however, the differences between groups do not narrow 
quite as substantially at the high levels of ideology strength with a .06 difference in the 
probability of defecting between liberals and libertarians with a strong identity. 
Ticket-splitting shows similar trends to defecting although with statistically significant 
differences between libertarians and both consistent ideologue groups at the lower levels of party 
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and ideological identity (Figures 10 and 11). The predicted probability of self-describ d 
independents with liberal issue positions splitting their ticket is .34 (95% CI: .29, .39), while that 
of libertarians is .48 (95% CI: .42, .55). Communitarians fall in between consistent ideologu s 
and libertarians in the likelihood of splitting their ticket at .43 (95% CI: .35, .52), although this 
difference is not statistically different from either group. Again, the trends are similar across 
groups based on ideology strength instead of party strength.  
Liberals and conservatives have the lowest probability of ticket-splitting across all 
ideology strengths, while libertarians have the highest probability – even higher than moderates.  
Among liberals, those who are unable to identify themselves as having an ideology, .24 (95% CI: 
.20, .28) are predicted to split their ticket while only .15 (95% CI: .12, .18) of those with a strong
ideology can be expected to vote for different parties. On the other hand, libertarians who are 
unable to identify themselves as having an ideology, .36 (95% CI: .31, .41) are predicted to split 
their ticket while only .24 (95% CI: .20, 28) of those with a strong ideology can be expectd to 
vote for different parties. Libertarians with a strong identity have the same probability of 
splitting their ticket as do consistent liberals and conservatives with no ideological identity at all, 
indicating an important difference between these groups other than just identity.  
Figure 10: Predicted Probability of Split 
Ticket, by Party Strength 
Figure 11: Predicted Probability of Split 
Ticket, by Ideology Strength 
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The trends and differences between groups, independent of party and ideological 
identities, become particularly notable when we consider the probabilities of defecting and 
ticket-splitting over time. Although there exists some within group variation, the overall trends 
for the probability of both vote defection and ticket-splitting indicate an increasing difference 
between the dual and consistent ideologue groups. All groups were less likely to defec  and 
ticket-split in the 2000s, especially among those with strong political identities, which is 
expected given increasing polarization. But, liberals and conservatives decline at a much higher 
rate than dual ideologues, thus increasing the gap between groups and suggesting that the 
importance of identities and affective polarization has had a much more significant impact on 
consistent ideologues than those with competing issue positions.  
The probability of defecting from one’s party in the presidential races of the 1980swas 
fairly consistent across groups at all levels of partisan and ideological identities as seen in Figure 
12. For those with no partisan identity, the probability of defecting differs by only .03 between 
the highest and lowest groups and only .02 for those with strong party identity. Similarly, the 
difference between those with no partisan identity and a strong partisan identity ranges is 
relatively low at an average of only .13 among all groups. Beginning in the 1990s, we see the 
effects of polarization as the differences between groups and between identity strengths begin to 
take shape. Although the overall rates of defection in the 1990s were higher than the previous 
decade (a result of Ross Perot’s strong independent bids), the impact was especially gr at among 
those claiming no partisan identity. Liberals who claimed to be independents had a .4 (95% CI: 
.34, .45) predicted probability of defecting, while those with a strong party identity had only a 
.08 (95% CI: .05, .10) probability of defecting. This difference of .32 is the lowest among gr ups 
(libertarians see a difference of .44) and is significantly higher than the difference of only .13 
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between high and low identity strength in the 1980s. Also notable in the 1990s is the widening 
gap between groups, particularly among those who have weaker levels of party identit . 
Consistent liberals consistently have the lowest level of defection, while libertar ans become 
significantly more likely to defect, with communitarians and conservatives occupying the middle 
ground during the 1990s. 
However, the differences between consistent ideologues and libertarians becomes 
especially pronounced in the 2000 elections. Among all levels of party strength, both consistent 
liberals and conservatives have low probabilities of defecting (ranging from .3 for no party 
identity, .02 for high party identity). Libertarians on the other hand have relatively high predicted 
probabilities of defecting at .48 for those with no partisan identity, but still a low probability of 
only .06 for those with a strong identity.  
Figure 12: Probability of Vote Defection Over Time, by Party Strength 
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Ideological identity plays a role remarkably similar to that of partisan identity al hough 
the overall probabilities of defection are lower for each level of ideological strength as seen in 
figure 13. For those with no ideological identities, the predicted probability of defecting ranges 
from only .15 to .18 (as compared to .20 to 23 for partisan identity). Similarly, in the 2000s, the 
probability of defecting shows greater variability among groups, although the overall probability 
is lower than for partisan identity. In the 2000 presidential elections, liberals with no ideological 
identity had a probability of defecting of only .07 (95% CI: .05, .09), while libertarians had a
probability of defecting of .14 (95% CI: .11, .17). However, at the highest end of ideological 
strength, there exists more variation between groups than we saw with partisan identity. So, 
while liberals with a strong ideological identity had a predicted probability of defecting of .05 
(95% CI: .03, .08), libertarians had a probability of .10 (95% CI: .09, .13).  
Figure 13: Probability of Vote Defection Over Time, by Ideology Strength 
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Comparing consistent ideologues with libertarians generally conforms to expectations 
with larger differences in defection rates for the dual ideologue group, although this difference is 
especially pronounced at weaker levels of party identification and only marginally significant for 
those with a strong partisan or ideological identity. Communitarians, on the other hand, defy 
expectations for dual ideologues and have a low probability of defecting across the decades. In 
the 2000s, communitarian’s probability of defecting was particularly low and on par with both 
consistent ideologue groups. 
The trends for ticket-splitting are similar but more pronounced than those for defection in 
the presidential race alone (see Figure 14). Overall rates of ticket-splitting also remained higher 
than defection even for those with strong identities. Although there was significant differences 
between the ideologue groups at each level of both partisan and ideological identity, there is a 
Figure 14: Probability of Split Ticket Over Time, by Party Strength 
50 
 
clear downward trend in the probability of splitting one’s ticket from the 1980s through the 
2000s, as we would expect given increasing polarization. For example, in the 1980s, strong 
liberals had a .18 probability (95% CI: .15, .21) of ticket-splitting, in the 2000s this fell to only .1 
(95% CI: .07, .14). Most notable about ticket-splitting, however, is the significant differences 
among dual and consistent ideologues even for those with strong partisan and ideological 
identities. While consistent liberals with a strong party identity had a .1 probability of ticket-
splitting in the 2000s, libertarians had a .2 probability (95% CI: .17, .24), with communitaria s 
not far behind at a .19 probability (95% CI: .16, .22). Differences between these groups, but 
based on a strong ideological identity, are even more pronounced (Figure 15). Liberals with a 
strong ideology had a .11 (95% CI: .08, .15) probability of a split ticket, while libertarians had a 
.25 probability (95% CI: .22, .27), and communitarians had a .24 probability (95% CI: .20, .29).  




Overall then, the data for presidential vote defection and ticket-split ing largely confirms 
the hypotheses about differences between dual and consistent ideologues at least in considering 
libertarians. The first hypothesis stated that those with stronger partisan identities would be less 
likely to defect or split their ticket. This was overwhelmingly confirmed with an increase in the 
strength of both partisan and ideological identity resulting in a decrease in the likelihood of both 
defecting and ticket-splitting across all ideologue groups. The second hypothesis stated that dual 
ideologues would be more likely to defect and to ticket-split than consistent ideologues. In the 
vote defection model, the general trends for party identity point in this direction, with dual 
ideologues more likely to defect, but none of the differences approached statistical s gnificance 
especially at the strongest levels of identity. This is also true of ideological identit es but with 
stronger, statistically significant differences between liberals and libertarians at the weaker levels 
of identity.  
The evidence in the ticket-splitting model was stronger with larger and statistically 
significant differences between liberals and libertarians who are independent, although again this 
gap narrows for those with a strong identity. In both the vote defection and ticket-splitting 
models, communitarians display different effects than do libertarians as they typically fall 
between libertarians and consistent ideologues in their probability of defecting or ticket-splitting 
but with no statistically significant differences with either of these groups.  
Once again the differences between libertarians and consistent ideologues become more 
pronounced over time as expected in the third hypothesis of this section. In the 1980s, few 
differences existed between the probability of dual ideologues versus consistent ideologues to 
defect or split their ticket. These gaps widen significantly in the 1990s and 2000s with 
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libertarians becoming significantly more likely to defect and split their tickets than both liberals 
and conservatives. Again, communitarians defy expectations for dual ideologues, howver, as 








Previous literature suggests that those who identify more strongly with a party or 
ideology also vote and participate at higher rates (Huddy, Mason, and Aarøe 2015). As 
polarization and political identities have increase, so too has participation, especially in the 
2000s.  For several decades prior to the 2000s, little over half of the eligible electorate voted in 
presidential elections; but in 2004, 61% voted and in 2008, 59% voted. More importantly, 
participation in electoral activities beyond voting also increased substantially. Based on data 
form the American National Election Studies, in 2000, only 10% of citizens displayed a 
campaign sign, button or bumper sticker. In 2004, this increased to 21%.  And in 2004, 48% of 
citizens reported trying to influence someone else’s vote during the campaign, an increase of 
16% over levels seen in 2000. 
However, substantial demographic differences between the ideologue groups should in 
itself point to differences in participation levels. Those with higher incomes and education are 
more likely to participate regardless of ideology (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), which indicates 
that libertarians should participate at higher levels. However, high levels of partisan identity 
should also make the communitarian group more likely to participate, while the significant 
differences in ideological identification between libertarians and communitarians should also 
prompt differences in participation rates. Overall communitarians display several factors that 
may each prompt lower participation including lower incomes and education, as well  
significantly lower rates of ideological identification. Given these factors, I examine the 
following hypotheses in this section:  
1) Among both ideologue groups, those with stronger partisan and ideological identities will 
be more likely to vote and to engage in other forms of electoral participation.  
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2) Dual ideologues should be less likely to vote and less likely to participate in other 
electoral activities than consistent ideologues, across identity strengths. Although this 
will be more pronounced for communitarians than libertarians.  
3) Over time, dual ideologues should become less likely to vote and participate in other 
electoral activities in comparison to consistent ideologues.   
 
As expected, given the above factors, clear differences exist in voting rates – but only for 
one type of inconsistent ideologue. While 75% of conservatives voted, only 47% of 
communitarian respondents reported that they did so. This pattern does not hold for libertarians. 
Among this group, 73% voted, which is actually higher than the 70% of consistent liberals who 
voted. The trend is similar among communitarians for electoral participation beyd voting. 
While 39% of both liberals and conservatives participated in at least one activity beyond voting, 
only 18% of communitarian respondents did so. Libertarians respondents also reported 
participating at lower rates than consistent ideologues, but only slightly at 34%. 
These trends largely hold up over time and while all groups show fluctuations in their 
participation rates, the up and down patterns are fairly consistent across group . As Figure 16 
displays, communitarians have lagged behind voting rates in every election since 1984. The 
other groups have shown much more variation in their relation to each other. In 1984, liberals 
voted at lower rates than either conservatives or libertarians. In 2008, the three groups voted at 
nearly the same rate, with liberals just slightly voting at a higher rate than the other two. While 
Figure 16: Percent Voting Figure 17: Participation Beyond Voting 
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libertarians lagged behind conservatives in many years, in 2004, libertarians voted more than 
either conservatives or liberals.  
A similar story is evident with participation beyond voting as seen in Figure 17. 
Communitarians lag substantially behind the other groups with less than 30% participating in 
any sort of campaign activity until 2004, when they participated at rates similar to moderates, 
approaching 40%. Libertarians do have slightly lower rates of participation from 1984 to 1996, 
but in 2000 their participation rate increases to be on par with consistent ideologues. How ver, 
after 2000, their participation rate did not increase at the same rates as liberals and conservatives. 
While the clearest trend is that communitarians voted at substantially lower rates than the other 
ideological groups as well as moderates, libertarians do not display the same level of 
disengagement despite their dual ideologue status.  
Clearly, substantial differences betw en these groups exist and a number of factors likely 
contribute to the differences in participation – especially that seen among communitarians. Table 
11 displays the result of a logit model of voting (column 1) and a negative binomial regression 
model of electoral activity (column 2). Several variables are statistically significant n predicting 
voting. As expected, higher levels of education and income lead to a higher likelihood of voting. 
Education has the highest magnitude with a coefficient of .656. Among the various types of 
ideologues, none of the groups have a statistically significant connection to voting. All groups, 
except communitarians, have a positive coefficient, indicating they would be more likely to 
participate than moderates but none approach levels of significance.  
 However, both partisan and ideological identity have a significant effect on voting. 
Ideology is statistically significant with a coefficient of .187, although this is sub tantially below 
the strength of partisan attachment wi h a coefficient of .458. A one category change in partisan 
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identity increases the odds of voting by 58% (z=10.692 p<.001), while a on category change in 
the strength of ideology increases the odds of voting by 21% (z=4.804 p<.001).  
Table 11: Logit (model 1)  and Negative Binomial (model 2) Results 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Voting Electoral Participation 
   
Liberal 0.138 0.292*** 
 (0.120) (0.0595) 
Conservative  0.254 0.143** 
 (0.129) (0.0614) 
Libertarian 0.0120 -0.130 
 (0.138) (0.0705) 
Communitarian -0.169 0.0789 
 (0.134) (0.0803) 
Education 0.656*** 0.154*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0248) 
Income 0.299*** 0.0912*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0203) 
Age 0.0310*** 0.00196 
 (0.00273) (0.00127) 
Female 0.148 -0.0416 
 (0.0857) (0.0399) 
Race -0.157*** -0.0146 
 (0.0604) (0.0322) 
South -0.363*** 0.00464 
 (0.0878) (0.0428) 
Knowledge 0.0718*** 0.0375*** 
 (0.0149) (0.00718) 
Efficacy 0.0718 0.116*** 
 (0.0698) (0.0317) 
Party Identity 0.458*** 0.174*** 
 (0.0428) (0.0215) 
Ideological strength 0.187*** 0.184*** 
 (0.0388) (0.0203) 
Constant -4.343*** -2.485*** 
 (0.293) (0.141) 
 





Observations 4,169 4,169 
   
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 
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 The full effects of partisan and ideological strength for each ideological group can be 
seen in Figures 18 and 19. For all ideology types, someone who reports a strong partisan identity 
is more likely to vote than someone in lower categories is. The least likely to vote in all groups is 
someone who reports an independent identity. As we can see from Figure 18, communitarians 
are the least likely to vote at all levels of party strength. However, there are nostatistically 
significant differences between the groups within the same levels of partisan identity. For 
example, the probability of a consistent conservative with a strong party identification voting is 
.90 (95% CI: .88, .92), the highest probability of all groups. The probability of a communitaria , 
also with a strong party identification, voting is .86 (95% CI: .82, .89). However, the probability  
 of a communitarian with strong party identity voting is significantly greater than that of either a 
consistent liberal or consistent conservative who report either independent or only leaning 
partisanship, indicating the importance of party identity in influencing whether one votes. The 
probability of an independent conservative voting is .69 (95% CI: .65, .75). A strong party 
identity among libertarians and communitarians can overcome competing issue positions to 
encourage voting at higher rates than independents or leaning partisans among consistent 
ideologues. In fact, even a communitarian with a weak party identity is more likely to vote 
(probability of .79, 95% CI .76, .83) than an independent liberal or conservative, although about 
as equally likely to vote as a leaning liberal or conservative (.78, 95% CI: .76, .82). In addition, 
the gap between consistent and dual ideologues narrows at the top of the scale. Among those 
identifying as independents there is a .09 difference in the predicted probability of conservatives 
versus communitarians voting (the highest and lowest group respectively). At the top of the 
scale, among those identifying as strong partisns, the difference narrows to just .04.  
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The impact of ideology strength on voting is less pronounced than that of party identity. 
As portrayed in Figure 19, the least likely to vote among all groups are those w say they 
“don’t know” when asked to identify their ideology, however the differences between the 
majority of categories are not statistically significant. For both consistent and dual ideologues 
those with a strong self-reported ideology are more likely to vote than those who report “don’t 
know” within the same ideologue group. However, ideological identity does not have the same 
impact as partisan identity among dual ideologues. Even communitarians with a strong 
ideological identity are no more likely to vote than consistent conservatives or liberals who say 
they don’t know or are moderate. The predicted probability of strong communitarians voting is 
.82 (95% CI: .78, .86), while that of moderate consistent conservatives is .83 (95% CI: .8, .86).  
 The story is somewhat different for electoral participation beyond voting. In this model, 
both consistent conservatives and liberals are more likely to participate than moderates and dual 
ideologues.  Being a consistent liberal increases the expected number of activities by 34% (.196 
activities significant at p<.001), holding all other variables constant. Consiste t conservatives are 
expected to see an increase of 15.4% (.089 activities, p<.05) over moderates. Although 
libertarians have a negative coefficient, this effect is not significant at the .05 l vel. However, on 
Figure 18: Predicted Probability of Voting, by 
Party Strength 




average, holding all other variables constant, a libertarian is expected to participate n .16 fewer 
activities than a conservative and .27 fewer than a liberal (both effects significant at p<.001).  
Similarly, a communitarian is expected to participate in .15 fewer activities than a liberal 
(p<.01), and .12 fewer activities than a libertarian (p<.05), holding all other variables constant.  
 Figure 20 displays the effects of party strength for each type of ideologue. In all cases, 
increasing party strength decreases the likelihood of not participating in an electoral activity 
beyond voting. Within each ideologue group, an increase in party strength equals a significant 
decrease in the probability of no participation, but significant differences also exist between 
groups. A strong liberal has a .42 probability of not participating, while a strong communitarian 
has a .61 probability of not participating, a difference of .19 (p<.01). Libertarians with a strong 
party identity have a .55 probability of not participating.   
In all ideology groups, those with a strong party identity have higher probabilities of 
participating in one, two, or three (or more) activities than do those with lower levels of party 
identity. Among conservatives, those who identify as moderate have a .28 probability of 
participating in one activity and a .061 probability of participating in two. Those with a strong 
identity have a probability of .35 and .128 in participating in one or two activities respectively, a 
Figure 20: Predicted Probability of No 
Participation, by Party Strength 
Figure 21: Predicted Probability of No 
Participation, by Ideology Strength 
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difference of .07 in both cases (p<.001). Dual ideologues have similar levels of change between 
levels of identity, indicating a similar magnitude of effect for party identity across ideologue 
types. 
Unlike the voting model where the magnitude of partisan strength’s effect on voting was 
much larger than ideological identity, in this model the two have very similar effects. Figure 21 
displays the effects of ideology strength for each type of ideologue. Just as in the discussion of 
party strength, in all cases, increasing ideology strength decreases the likelihood of not 
participating in an electoral activity beyond voting. Within each ideologue group, an increase in 
party strength equals a significant decrease in the probability of no participation, but once again 
significant differences also exist between groups. A liberal who identifies as having a strong 
ideology has a .41 probability of not participating, while a strong communitarian has a .56 
probability of not participating, a difference of .15 (p<.01). Libertarians with a strong ideological 
identity fall in the middle with a .54 probability of not participating.  However, despit  the 
impact of party and ideological identity, dual ideologues still participate at significantly lower 
rates than consistent ideologues. 
Over time, dual ideologue groups show much greater variation in their propensity to vote
than do the consistent groups indicating a more uncertain response to increasing polarization. In 
the 1980s, there was only small differences between the groups in their probability of vo ing as 
shown in Figure 22. At the low end of party strength, the difference between communitarians, 
who were least likely to vote, and conservatives and libertarians, who were most likely to vote, is 
only .09. At the strong identity strength, the difference narrows further to only .05, but none of 
these differences between groups is statistically significant. 
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 In the 1990s, however, the differences between consistent and dual ideologues become 
more pronounced. Liberals and conservatives increased their probability of voting during this 
time. Communitarians also increased their probability of voting, but not to the same degree as 
the consistent groups, while libertarians greatly decreased in the likelihood of voting. The 
differences between communitarians and consistent ideologues increased even further in the 
2000s with communitarians decreasing substantially in their likelihood of voting especially at the 
lower levels of party identity. For independents, communitarians showed a .15 lower pr bability 
of voting than consistent ideologues. However, once again we see the important effects of party 
identification on voting as those with a strong identity show less significant differences with only 
a .06 lower probability of voting for communitarians. Libertarians, however, increased their 
Figure 22: Predicted Probability of Voting Over Time, by Party Strength 
62 
 
participation in the 2000s and are on par with consistent ideologues in this decade further 
contradicting hypothesis 3.  
The effects of ideological identity on voting show similar trends with communitarians 
always the least likely to vote regardless of ideology strength, but with libertar ans decreasing in 
their likelihood of voting in the 1990s. The trends over time for electoral participation beyd 
voting further reinforce the overall trends discussed earlier. In the 1980s, based on both party and 
ideological strength, communitarians are the most likely to not participate in any activities, while 
liberals are the least likely to not participate. Unlike voting, libertarians are not as inclined to 
participate otherwise, with their levels of participation only slightly higher t an that of 
communitarians. These trends are only magnified in the 1990s and 2000s, as expected given 
growing polarization, as the differences in participation levels increase betw en dual and 
Figure 23: Predicted Probability of Voting Over Time, by Ideology Strength 
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consistent ideologues at all levels of party and ideology strength. Consistent ideologues 
decreased in their probability of not participating at all levels of party and ideological identity 
between the 1980s and 2000s, but this trend is particularly notable among those with low identity 
strengths. In the 1980s, liberals with a strong ideological identity were 14% more likely to 
participate than communitarians, but in the 2000s, they were 19% more likely to participate n at 
least one electoral activity beyond voting. During this timeframe, all groups with a strong 
ideological identity were less likely to not participate at all in the 2000s. However, among dual 
ideologues, those with no identity or a moderate identity actually increased in their probability of 
not participating with consistent ideologues the same identity strength decreased in th ir 
probability of not participating further widening the gap among the ideologue groups. 
 




 Overall, stronger identities do lead to higher levels of voting and participation across all 
cases as expected based on the first hypothesis. Further, strong and consistent is ue positions 
play an important role in influencing campaign activity, although not voting, independently of 
political identity. While the overall trend for voting shows that dual ideologues vote less than 
their consistent counterparts, there was no statistically significant difference betwen these 
groups based on party identity and only small differences based on ideological identity, 
especially at strong levels of identity.  Even among those with a strong identity, however, dual 
ideologues do not participate at the same rates as consistent ideologues with the same strength of 
identity, as was expected and stated in hypothesis two. Finally, the overtime trends show that 
while both groups of ideologues have generally increased their participation between the 1980s 
Figure 25: Predicted Probability of No Participation Over Time, by Ideology Strength 
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and 2000s, consistent ideologues have become much more likely to participate while dual 
ideologues have seen increases that are more modest and a wider gap between their participation 





DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Clearly partisan and ideological identity affect consistent and dual ideologues similarly, 
which reinforces the strong role given to political identities in previous literatur. Across all tests 
of political behavior, those with a strong identity voted more consistently and participated more 
frequently than those with weaker identities. The effect of partisan identity was significant and 
strong in influencing both voting consistency and political participation. The effect of ideological 
identity was not as strong as that of partisanship in influencing voting, but was on par with 
partisanship in its effect on participation in other electoral activities.  
Issue positions do matter, however, in the propensity of at least some dual ideologues to 
identify with a party and ideological group, although results were mixed. Libertarians have a 
much lower likelihood of identifying with a party and those that do identify with a partyare 
much more likely to identify as a weak rather than strong partisan. Communitarians, though, 
defy expectations and are just as likely to identify with a party and to identify as a strong partisan 
as the consistent ideologues and over time they increased their party identification in response to 
polarization just as consistent ideologues did. In regards to ideological identity, libertarians were 
more likely to identify than were communitarians, although their likelihood of a strong 
ideological identification were again smaller than those of consistent ideologus. 
Communitarians were substantially less likely to identify with an ideological group or to identify 
with a strong ideology than either group of consistent ideologues; this did not change over time.  
 Still, the effect of identity does not explain all of the differences in political behavior 
between dual and consistent ideologues. Even among the highest categories of ideological and 
partisan identity strengths, differences in participation also persisted across ideology types. Even 
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among those with a strong identity, dual ideologues do not participate at the same rates as 
consistent ideologues with the same strength of identity. This is especially pronounced for 
communitarians who routinely voted and participated in other electoral activities at rates far 
below those of the other groups in all categories of identity.  
At least one group of dual ideologues was also more likely to split their ticket between 
opposing parties. Although the differences were less pronounced among those with strong 
identities, libertarians consistently split their ticket more frequently than consiste t ideologues, a 
difference that only grew over time with increasing polarization. Notably however, although the 
general trend showed more vote defection among libertarians, the differences betw en groups 
were not statistically significant indicating that dual ideologues are just as likely to vote with 
their party in presidential races. However, communitarian’s behavior on this measure conflicted 
with expectations as they were no more likely to defect from their party than consistent 
ideologues.  
 While identities do matter, something else is clearly also keeping dual ideologus from 
behaving in the same way as consistent ideologues. As Huddy, Mason, and Aaroe (2015) state, 
expressive identity plays an important role in campaign participation, but considering 
partisanship as either instrumental or expressive may over-simplify the situation. Further, dual 
ideologues’ behavior may differ from election to election as different issues are made salient, 
especially given that that ideology as a motivator for political participation varies over time 
depending on the strength of ideological cues given by party leaders and candidates (Saunders 
and Abramowitz 2004).  
While this paper finds that both political identities and issue positions matter the 
determinants of political identity are still uncertain. Much more research is needed to specify 
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how political identities are formed, and what factors influence the attitude of a weak versus 
strong identity. While many factors likely impact identity, issue positions may play a stronger, 
yet indirect role in behavior such as participation by impacting the strength of political identities. 
Thus, further research is needed to clarify and elaborate on the relationship between 
expressive partisanship and ideology and how they interact with strong issue positions. F rst, 
more robust measures of partisan and ideological identity would strengthen the rsults here. 
While self-identification is an important expression of identity, it may also conflate strong issue 
positions with identity, especially for ideological identity.  A multi-item scale for both identity 
measures would allow the ability to better tease out the differing effects of identity versus issue 
positions.  
Finally, this paper raised a number of questions about the variability between libertarians 
and communitarians. Despite both having competing issue positions, these two groups showed 
very different propensities to identify with political groups, to vote consistently, and to 
participate in elections, even when controlling for strong demographic differences in areas such 
as education and income. These variations between groups raise a number of questions about 
why communitarians react differently to the incongruence between their own issue positions and 
that of political elites.  On one hand, communitarians report strong partisan identities and when 
they do vote, routinely vote faithfully for their chosen party, which suggests that they have not 
become disaffected or alienated from the system despite political groups not adequately 
representing their interests. However, despite strong partisan identity, communitarians have 
much lower rates of ideological identity, often indicating that they can’t place themselves on the 
liberal-conservative scale and even when they do reporting weak identities. Further this group 
both votes and participates at much lower rates than any other group despite their strong partisan 
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identity. More research is needed to understand the sources of these incongruent findings and to 
determine whether competing issue positions are a driving factor for this group’s behavior or 
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Table 12: Predicted Probabilities of Party Identity Strength 
 Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
Independent .064 .095 .067 .068 
 (.058-.078) (.057-.074) (.059-.09) (.054-.081) 
Leaning .239 .229 .294 .238 
 (.218-.259) (.208-.250) (.261-.319) (.208-.269) 
Weak .315 .314 .314 .315 
 (.299-.330) (.298-.329) (.297-.329) (.299-.330) 
Strong .378 .394 .297 .379 
 (.349-.408) (.362-.425) (.266-.328) (.334-.424) 
Note: 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.  
SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study. 
 
Table 13: Predicted Probabilities of Ideological Group Identity Strength 
 Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
‘Don’t Know’ .129 .067 .155 .244 
 (.113-.145) (.057-.078) (.134-.176) (.208-.281) 
Moderate .213 .135 .237 .287 
 (.195-.232) (.119-.150) (.216-.257) (.266-.309) 
Weak .313 .278 .310 .274 
 (.296-.330) (.260-.297) (.293-.327) (.252-.297) 
Strong .344 .520 .298 .194 
 (.329-.373) (.486-.554) (.267-.315) (.163-.226) 
Note: Confidence intervals in parentheses.  
SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study. 
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                  Standard errors in parentheses 
                  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 14: Ordered Logit Results for Party Identification 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 1980s 1990s 2000s 
    
Liberal 0.300** 0.496*** 0.705*** 
 (0.153) (0.131) (0.223) 
Conservative 0.387*** 0.618*** 0.531** 
 (0.142) (0.136) (0.266) 
Libertarian 0.166 0.0296 -0.0942 
 (0.149) (0.153) (0.253) 
Communitarian 0.315* 0.502** 0.881** 
 (0.163) (0.196) (0.415) 
Education 0.0981 0.131** 0.0631 
 (0.0610) (0.0601) (0.112) 
Income -0.0573 -0.0431 0.0946 
 (0.0494) (0.0483) (0.0821) 
Age 0.0180*** 0.0199*** 0.0129** 
 (0.00321) (0.00314) (0.00571) 
Female 0.317*** 0.0472 0.551*** 
 (0.0971) (0.0965) (0.169) 
Race 0.0677 0.0297 -0.0187 
 (0.0801) (0.0755) (0.114) 
South 0.0345 0.0712 0.375** 
 (0.108) (0.103) (0.175) 
Knowledge 0.0293* 0.0197 0.0278 
 (0.0175) (0.0174) (0.0317) 
Efficacy 0.220** 0.0539 -0.143 
 (0.0920) (0.0716) (0.132) 
Correct Placement -0.0704 0.123 0.0394 
 (0.125) (0.137) (0.242) 
Constant cut1 -0.713** -0.668** -0.844 
 (0.329) (0.321) (0.593) 
Constant cut2 1.018*** 1.146*** 1.203** 
 (0.325) (0.317) (0.588) 
Constant cut3 2.369*** 2.549*** 2.209*** 
 (0.330) (0.322) (0.595) 
    
Psuedo R2 .24 .21 .22 





Table 15: Ordered Logit Results for Ideological ID 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 1980s 1990s 2000s 
    
Liberal 0.772*** 0.546*** 1.177*** 
 (0.153) (0.130) (0.218) 
Conservative 1.289*** 1.403*** 2.367*** 
 (0.145) (0.139) (0.304) 
Libertarian 0.657*** 0.181 0.897*** 
 (0.145) (0.153) (0.254) 
Communitarian -0.0745 -0.0486 -0.179 
 (0.162) (0.198) (0.395) 
Education 0.319*** 0.521*** 0.293*** 
 (0.0616) (0.0609) (0.113) 
Income 0.0287 0.0362 -0.0739 
 (0.0496) (0.0485) (0.0828) 
Age -0.000439 0.00122 -0.00412 
 (0.00320) (0.00315) (0.00569) 
Female -0.155 -0.179* 0.143 
 (0.0972) (0.0973) (0.169) 
Race -0.123 -0.243*** -0.0417 
 (0.0805) (0.0760) (0.118) 
South -0.0440 -0.176* 0.0535 
 (0.111) (0.104) (0.177) 
Knowledge -0.0128 0.0147 -0.0458 
 (0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0321) 
Efficacy 0.321*** 0.0919 0.166 
 (0.0928) (0.0728) (0.133) 
Correct Placement 0.578*** 0.661*** 0.722*** 
 (0.127) (0.144) (0.243) 
Constant cut1 0.371 0.643** 0.205 
 (0.328) (0.317) (0.593) 
Constant cut2 1.602*** 1.943*** 1.477** 
 (0.328) (0.320) (0.597) 
Constant cut3 2.918*** 3.273*** 2.724*** 
 (0.334) (0.326) (0.605) 
    
Psuedo R2 .24 .26 .23 
Observations 1,521 1,584 1,121 
Standard errors in parentheses 






Table 16: Predicted Probabilities of Party Identity Strength Over Time 
  1980s   
 Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
Independent .076 .070 .086 .075 
 (.057-.095) (.054-.086) (.065-.106) (.055-.095) 
Leaning .241 .228 .260 .238 
 (.205-.279) (.197-.260) (.225-.296) (.200-.278) 
Weak .324 .323 .325 .325 
 (.301-.349) (.299-.348) (.301-.350) (.300-.349) 
Strong .359 .379 .328 .281 
 (.307-.410) (.333-.426) (.280-.377) (.203-.359) 
1990s 
 Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
Independent .065 .058 .100 .065 
 (.051-.080) (.044-.072) (.075-.126) (.042-.088) 
Leaning .235 .217 .306 .234 
 (.205-.265) (.186-.248) (.265-.347) (.181-287) 
Weak .336 .332 .329 .335 
 (.311-.360) (.307-.356) (.304-.355) (.310-.360) 
Strong .364 .393 .264 .365 
 (.322-.406) (.346-.406) (.216-.312) (.286-.445) 
2000s 
 Liberal Conservative Libertarian Communitarian 
Independent .051 .061 .108 .044 
 (.032-.071) (.032-.089) (.064-.141) (.010-.077) 
Leaning .244 .273 .376 .217 
 (.194-.295) (.200-.346) (.307-.444) (.103-.331) 
Weak .239 .244 .236 .230 
 (.200-.278) (.205-.283) (.196-.276) (.176-.285) 
Strong .465 .422 .281 .509 
 (.395-.535) (.320-.524) (.203-.359) (.324-.694) 
Note: 95% Confidence intervals in parentheses.  
SOURCE: 1984-2008 American National Election Study. 
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Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 17: Logit Results for Vote Defection 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Vote Defection 80s Vote Defection 90s Vote Defection 00s 
    
Liberal -0.114 -0.757*** -0.566 
 (0.293) (0.210) (0.466) 
Conservative -0.0699 -0.252 -0.550 
 (0.259) (0.208) (0.628) 
Libertarian 0.0239 0.0222 0.149 
 (0.271) (0.229) (0.469) 
Communitarian -0.171 -0.259 -0.645 
 (0.302) (0.322) (1.139) 
Education -0.253** -0.204** 0.164 
 (0.114) (0.0936) (0.228) 
Income 0.0276 0.0577 -0.290* 
 (0.0948) (0.0753) (0.169) 
Age -0.00294 -0.0198*** -0.00143 
 (0.00576) (0.00504) (0.0115) 
Female 0.240 0.0864 0.439 
 (0.184) (0.151) (0.352) 
Race -0.251 -0.269* -0.410 
 (0.170) (0.138) (0.297) 
South 0.513*** -0.0849 -0.443 
 (0.192) (0.168) (0.390) 
Knowledge 0.0224 -0.00492 0.0186 
 (0.0321) (0.0273) (0.0666) 
Efficacy -0.574*** -0.0982 0.256 
 (0.196) (0.114) (0.259) 
Party Strength -0.329*** -0.695*** -0.916*** 
 (0.113) (0.0943) (0.227) 
Ideology Strength -0.204** -0.155** -0.144 
 (0.0848) (0.0732) (0.182) 
Constant 0.957 3.190*** 1.420 
 (0.718) (0.574) (1.254) 
    
Psuedo R2 .29 .27 .24 
Observations 1,180 1,262 929 
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   Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 18: Logit Results for Split Ticket Voting 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Split Ticket 80s Split Ticket 90s Split Ticket 00s 
    
Liberal -0.445* -0.221 -0.622** 
 (0.229) (0.208) (0.247) 
Conservative -0.165 -0.640*** -0.278 
 (0.197) (0.228) (0.325) 
Libertarian 0.271 -0.388 0.338 
 (0.202) (0.254) (0.251) 
Communitarian -0.221 -0.290 0.220 
 (0.238) (0.366) (0.396) 
Education -0.144* -0.00586 0.0810 
 (0.0851) (0.0973) (0.114) 
Income 0.0739 0.299*** 0.0746 
 (0.0746) (0.0820) (0.0853) 
Age -0.00822* 0.00206 -0.00278 
 (0.00456) (0.00537) (0.00588) 
Female 0.272** 0.163 0.0565 
 (0.137) (0.159) (0.178) 
Race -0.200 -0.220 0.186 
 (0.127) (0.142) (0.120) 
South 0.350** 0.283 -0.0840 
 (0.152) (0.172) (0.189) 
Knowledge 0.00388 -0.0113 0.0523 
 (0.0250) (0.0291) (0.0327) 
Efficacy -0.398*** -0.429*** -0.407*** 
 (0.0712) (0.0838) (0.0944) 
Party Strength -0.182*** -0.276*** -0.0848 
 (0.0660) (0.0768) (0.0868) 
Ideology Strength 1.260** -0.0175 -0.725 
 (0.504) (0.565) (0.615) 
    
Psuedo R2 .24 .26 .23 
Observations 1,150 1,076 965 
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        Standard errors in parentheses 
          *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 19: Logit results for Voting Participation Over Time 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Voting 1980s Voting 1990s Voting 2000s 
    
Liberal -0.0205 0.241 0.219 
 (0.193) (0.183) (0.313) 
Conservative 0.185 0.281 0.687 
 (0.187) (0.206) (0.440) 
Libertarian 0.157 -0.109 -0.0128 
 (0.207) (0.221) (0.358) 
Communitarian -0.204 0.00609 -0.614 
 (0.189) (0.225) (0.450) 
Education 0.607*** 0.667*** 0.775*** 
 (0.0870) (0.0944) (0.164) 
Income 0.314*** 0.314*** 0.196* 
 (0.0616) (0.0682) (0.118) 
Age 0.0312*** 0.0325*** 0.0218*** 
 (0.00402) (0.00449) (0.00772) 
Female 0.0864 0.206 0.311 
 (0.126) (0.137) (0.242) 
Race -0.0727 -0.281*** -0.0589 
 (0.0946) (0.0945) (0.155) 
South -0.267** -0.506*** -0.303 
 (0.132) (0.139) (0.240) 
Knowledge 0.0610*** 0.107*** 0.0489 
 (0.0214) (0.0244) (0.0465) 
Efficacy 0.0294 0.0786 0.158 
 (0.114) (0.104) (0.189) 
Party Strength 0.408*** 0.482*** 0.613*** 
 (0.0615) (0.0701) (0.124) 
Ideology Strength 0.112** 0.332*** -0.0570 
 (0.0563) (0.0636) (0.110) 
Constant -4.089*** -4.661*** -4.272*** 
 (0.441) (0.468) (0.829) 
    
Psuedo R2 .18 .19 .19 
Observations 1,790 1,803 1,275 
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  Standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 20:Negative Binomial Results for Participation Beyond Voting Over Time 
 (1) (3) (5) 
VARIABLES Participation 1980s Participation 1990s Participation 2000s 
    
Liberal 0.266*** 0.265*** 0.412*** 
 (0.100) (0.0888) (0.146) 
Conservative 0.00249 0.249*** 0.316* 
 (0.0984) (0.0905) (0.177) 
Libertarian -0.124 -0.201* -0.0134 
 (0.107) (0.117) (0.175) 
Communitarian 0.00938 0.0910 0.516** 
 (0.115) (0.141) (0.228) 
Education 0.177*** 0.119*** 0.115* 
 (0.0397) (0.0380) (0.0637) 
Income 0.0947*** 0.0890*** 0.0966** 
 (0.0333) (0.0311) (0.0479) 
Age 0.00109 0.000736 0.00432 
 (0.00206) (0.00200) (0.00326) 
Female -0.0371 -0.0745 0.0863 
 (0.0646) (0.0613) (0.0988) 
Race -0.0132 -0.111** 0.0972 
 (0.0542) (0.0535) (0.0659) 
South 0.00469 0.0464 -0.0972 
 (0.0719) (0.0642) (0.101) 
Knowledge 0.231*** 0.110*** 0.176*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0328) (0.0529) 
Efficacy 0.0349*** 0.0474*** 0.0393** 
 (0.0118) (0.0112) (0.0179) 
Party Strength 0.187*** 0.0791* 0.0450 
 (0.0569) (0.0453) (0.0763) 
Ideology Strength 0.152*** 0.227*** 0.119** 
 (0.0314) (0.0323) (0.0507) 
Constant -2.715*** -2.105*** -2.436*** 
 (0.231) (0.213) (0.371) 
    
Psuedo R2 .21 .25 .23 
Observations 1,882 1,804 576 
